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Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff
Privileges Cases
by BarbaraCray*

Introduction
Staff privileges' at a hospital have become an important part of the
modem doctor's practice of medicine. Due to the many technical ad-

vances in medical science and the increased use of sophisticated and
expensive equipment in the diagnosis and treatment of illness, most

medical specialists would be effectively precluded from practicing their
profession if they were not allowed to rely on the resources of a hospital.2
Yet at the same time that the physician's need for access to hospi-

tal facilities has increased, hospitals have become more selective in
their granting of privileges to the physician. A hospital can be held
liable for injuries to patients resulting from physician malpractice
where the hospital was negligent in allowing the delinquent physician
to remain on the staff.3 This theory of hospital liability, in an era of
increasing medical malpractice litigation, has forced the hospital to be-

come more selective in its appointment and reappointment of physicians to its staff and more active in its revocation of privileges from

staff members it feels may become a liability.
This tension between the increased demand for staff privileges on
the one hand and the restraint in granting privileges on the other has
led to frequent controversy between the physician deprived of privi* B.A., 1976, Wellesley College; J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the Law, University
of California. Member California Bar.
1. Staff privileges are the way in which physicians are afforded the use of hospital
facilities. Hospitals grant doctors the use of their hospital in exchange for their business of
bringing in patients. They are termed "privileges" because there is no absolute right to
practice medicine in a hospital; rather there is discretion in the hospital's governing body as
to who may so practice. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927).
2. See Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 345 P.2d 93, 97
(1959). See also Parts II and III, infra.
3. Darling v. Charleston Com. Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); see also Hanson & Stromberg, HospitalLiabilityforNegligence,
21 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1969); Walkup & Kelly, HospitalLiability. ChangingPatternsof Responsibility, 8 U.S.F. L. REv. 247 (1973); Note, Independent Duty of a Hospital to Prevent
Physicians'Malpractice,15 ARIz. L. REV. 953 (1973); Comment, The Hospital-PhysicianRelationshio: Hospital Responsibility/or Malpractice of Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REV. 385
(1975).
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leges and the hospital making that determination. Physicians are now
resorting to the courts to insist that hospitals afford them procedural
due process protections before being denied privileges. That physicians
have begun to insist on their procedural due process rights in this context indicates an awareness of legal rights by a group of citizens who
were, until recently, not highly concerned with the legal aspects of the
practice of their profession. In the past, procedural due process protections relating to staff privileges were generally not afforded nor were
such protections seriously in issue due to the medical profession's belief
that physicians can best police themselves. This asserted special ability,
and responsibility, has been recognized by the courts, 4 and peer review
is still considered by the medical profession to be the essence of evaluating the physician's professional conduct.' That a physician is best
qualified to adjudge the quality of care rendered by another physician
is not open to challenge. But to assert that only a physician is suited to
sit on a tribunal that will determine whether another physician is allowed to practice in the hospital, without certain legal protections being
afforded the affected physician, is challengeable, and the crux of the
controversy.
In order to adequately protect the physician it is necessary that the
hospital follow formal procedures whenever staff privileges are in issue.
These procedures are usually found in the hospital's bylaws, which represent the contract between the hospital and the physician.6 The bylaws should set forth the precise procedures by which the physician's
staff privileges may be revoked. Both the physicians sitting in judgment and the affected physician are, accordingly, apprised of the appropriate legal standard and procedural protections. If the bylaws
procedure is not followed, a suit lies against the hospital for its breach.
Where the bylaws do not contain procedural protections as required by
law, a suit lies against the hospital for violation of the physician's due
process rights.7 What the law requires to be included in these bylaws is
the subject of this note.
Procedural protections are afforded by the due process clauses of
4. "The evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized
expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance . . . Courts must not
attempt to take on the escutcheon of Caduceus" Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of Val Verde
Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971); see Shulman v. Washington Hosp.
Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.C. 1963), affd, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5. In the introduction to the California Medical Association's GUIDING PRINCIPLES
FOR PHYSICIAN-HOsPITAL RELATIONSHIPS it is stated that self-disciplinary features are
stressed because "no one is better qualified to judge the quality of medical care than a physician." CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES 1 (1974).
6. Bylaws will be discussed in detail in Part V, infra.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974) authorizes a civil action for deprivation of rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States against a person acting under color of the
state.
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 8 but only with respect to the
deprivation of liberty or property under color of federal or state law. In
the context of hospital review of physician privileges, the initial inquiry
is whether the hospital is to be classified as "public" or "private". If it
is public, its actions are subject to the same constitutional controls as
any governmental entity and the due process clauses place limitations
on the manner in which a physician can be excluded from the hospital's
staff.9 By contrast, if the hospital is classified as private, its actions are
viewed as discretionary, and the decision of its managing authorities,
who have the power to appoint and remove members at will, are final
and not subject to judicial review.'" The first section of this note examines the "state action" formulations of the United States Supreme
Court, with an analysis of their effect on hospital staff cases. The process by which a hospital is to be classified as public or private is also
discussed.
Of equal importance to due process protection is inquiry into
whether a liberty or property interest is deprived by the hospital denial
or revocation of staff privileges. Whether such a liberty or property
interest is affected in such proceedings will determine if due process is
required. The second section of this note examines recent Supreme
Court decisions as to when a liberty or property interest can be found
in physician staff privileges proceedings.
Where the action challenged for being procedurally improper is
that of a private entity, or where there is no threatened deprivation of
one of the constitutionally protected interests, there will be no due
process procedural protection. Because the Fourteenth Amendment is
applicable only in instances of state action, private groups in America
are able to wield vast powers and make numerous and often arbitrary
decisions affecting the individual without any private equivalent of due
process."I In addition, in recent decisions the Supreme Court has narrowed the finding of state action in private activities, limited the scope
of liberty and property interests and circumscribed the procedural protections required even where constitutional due process is applied.' 2
All this means less and less protection from private (as well as governmental) decisionmaking. Therefore, in most situations the physician's
staff privileges are largely unprotected. A few state courts, most nota8. U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.

9. Meredith v. Allen County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir.
1968).
10. Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 63 (D.C. 1963), affrd 348
F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965): see also Annot., 37 A.L.R. 3d 645, 659-60 (1971) for a listing of
states and cases that follow this rule.
11. See Traynor, "'BetterDays in Courtfora New Day's Problems," 17 VAND. L. REV.
109, 120-21 (1963).
12. See Parts I, II, and IV, infra.
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bly the courts of California, have recognized the interest of the physician in staff privileges and have fashioned common law procedural
protections of physician staff privileges through expanded judicial review of hospital decisions and a right of fair procedure to be followed
in staff privilege determination proceedings. The third section of the
note discusses this judicially developed solution.
Finally, given that some due process, or a fair procedure, is consti-

tutionally required, particular and practical procedures must be developed. The last section of this note deals with the process which is due

under both the due process and fair procedure approaches. After analyzing the basic requirements, some actual and suggested 13 hospital bylaws are examined to determine whether they do in fact provide the
protection developed and required by present law.

I.

Requirements to be Met in Order to Invoke Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process-State Action
By its terms, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law,"' 4 the Fourteenth Amendment

extends its procedural due process protections only to conduct attributable to the state, and not to that of private persons."' However, such
state action is not so strictly defined as to be linked to governmental

entities; it is often extended to seemingly private activities.' 6 Therefore,
for purposes of applying Fourteenth Amendment procedural protection to given conduct, the initial task is to determine when private conduct becomes state action. 7

13. The special role that hospital accrediting organizations are now taking in requiring
bylaws that supply due process protections, and the model bylaws they suggest, will be explored in this section.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. "Since the decision of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 2 (1883), the principle has
become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the
States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U S. 1, 13 (1948). The Court cites United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876),
which antedate the Civii Rights Cases but contain similar language concerning state action.
16. "Conduct that is formally 'private' may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
17. See general, Antoun, State Action.: JudicialPerpetuationof the State/PrivateDirtinction, 2 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 722 (1975); Quinn, State Action:. A Pathologyand a Proposed
Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1976); Note, State Action: Theories/orAppoing Constitutional
Restrictionsto PrivateActivity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
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Supreme Court Decisions

Modem Supreme Court decisions finding state action in private
activities begin with Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority.'8 In that
case the State of Delaware, through its agency the Wilmington Parking
Authority, owned and operated a parking building. To secure longterm construction financing of the facility, the Parking Authority leased
storefront space in the garage building to a private party for restaurant
use. The restaurant refused to serve the plaintiff Burton solely because
he was black. Burton sued the state agency alleging a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court rejected the finding of the Supreme Court of
Delaware that the restaurant was acting in "a purely private capacity"
and thus not subject to the equal protection clause guarantee.' 9 Although noting the impossibility of stating a "precise formula" to determine whether state action is present in a formally private activity, Mr.
Justice Clark, writing for the Court' concluded that "[o]nly by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of
2 ° "Sigthe State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.'
nificant" involvement of the state was found in the public ownership of
the land and building used by the restaurant, the receipt by the authority of public funds for the costs of construction and maintenance, and
the mutual benefits derived by both the private restaurant and the public parking garage in providing each other with business customers. 2
The Court also placed special emphasis on the fact that the restaurant
was operated as an integral part of the public facility, concluding that
the state has "elected to place its power, property and prestige behind
the admitted discrimination."2 2 After looking at the "facts and circumstances" of this case, Justice Clark decided that "[t]he state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence. . . that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on
that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private' as
to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 3
The Burton Court was careful to limit its holding to the facts of the
24
case, but its rationale has been frequently used as the standard for
18. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19. Id at 716-19.
20. Id at 722.
21. Id at 723-24.
22. Id at 724-25.
23. Id at 725.
24. "Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry what we hold today is that when a
State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case
here, the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as
certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the agreement itself." Id. at
726.
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finding state action, both for purposes of the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5 Indeed, the Burton
standard is quite loose-by including consideration of all facts or activities by which the state is related to the private entity, it offers little or
no guidance as to which facts are significant for the purposes of determining state action.
In Moose Lodge v. Irvis26 the Court had occasion to narrow the
broad test set forth in Burton. Moose Lodge involved a private club
which received a liquor license from the State of Pennsylvania, but refused service to a black guest solely on the basis of his race. Mr. Irvis
sued under § 198327 of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, alleging that the
licensing of Moose Lodge by the state agency amounted to state involvement in the club's activities and its discriminatory practices were
forbidden by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2" The Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
failed to find the "symbiotic relationship", as he termed the Burton requirement, placing special importance on the facts that the Moose
Lodge owned its own land, was a private club and served no state function or service. In sum, "while Eagle [the restaurant in Burton] was a
public restaurant in a public building, Moose Lodge is a private social
club in a private building. 2 9
The decision in Moose Lodge can, of course, be harmonized with
the Burton "significant involvement" test. After all, any legal criterion
that weighs factors only within the context of a particular case avoids,
on its face, any question of decision to decision consistency. But rather
than perpetuate the Burton doctrine by basing its decision in Moose
Lodge on differences between fact situations (and quite possibly value
judgments of the Justices), the Court narrowed the Burton test and established an additional requirement to a finding of state action. The
Court observed that there can be no automatic finding of state action
where a private entity receives "any sort of benefit or service at all from
the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree
whatever".3 ° Such a finding would "utterly emasculate the distinction
between private as distinguished from state conduct" traditionally adhered to by the Court in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.3"
Rather, "where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State
must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations,'
25. As to the use of this rationale in hospital staff privileges cases see discussion in notes
50-60 infra.
26. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1974).
28. 407 U.S. at 171.
29. Id at 175.
30. Id at 173.
31. Id

Fall 1979]

DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS

. . . in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of

the constitutional prohibition.

32

It is evident that Moose Lodge has greatly reduced, if not eliminated, the relevance of state regulation of a private entity to any finding

of state action.33 In its analysis of the particular regulation involved in
Moose Lodge, the Court observed that however detailed the regulation
might be, if it "cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial
discrimination," or "make the State in any realistic sense a partner or

even a joint venturer in the club's enterprise", a finding of state action
cannot be supported.34 Again, there must be a real connection between
the regulation and the discriminatory practice: general regulation is not
enough.35
The .most recent case to deal with the state action problem, and to
further limit Burton, is Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.36 In that

case the Court (again in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist), refused to find state action in the activities of a privately owned and operated corporation which was exclusively empowered by the state to
deliver electrical service. 37 The firm discontinued Jackson's residential

service without any notice or hearing, or even an opportunity to pay
amounts found due. 38 The utility's action in terminating the service
was allowed under a provision of its general tariff filed with the state
Utility Commission. 39 The Court did not require the utility to comply
32. Id (citation omitted).
33. See Note, supra note 17, at 688.
34. 407 U.S. at 176-77.
35. Relating this to the facts, the Court held that with one exception, the "Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board plays absolutely no part in establishing or enforcing the membership
or guest policies of the club that it licenses to serve liquor." Id at 175. The one exception
recognized by the Court is consistent with the Moose Lodge rationale. The Court enjoined
enforcement of a Liquor Control Board regulation requiring that "every club licensee shall
adhere to all of the provisions of its Constitution and By-Laws" where the constitution and
bylaws involved racial discrimination. The result of applying the regulation would be to
"invoke the sanctions of the state to enforce a concededly discriminatory private rule." 1d
at 179. Therefore, only where application of a state regulation specifically results in an
outcome not permitted under the Fourteenth Amendment will a finding of state action result.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) rejected this connection
between the complained of activity and the state involvement, believing that the State's liquor regulation 'significantly intertwined' the State with the operation of the club and lent
"'its authority to the sordid business of racial discrimination.'" Id at 186. These two Justices continued to adhere to the Burton test.
36. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
37. Metropolitan Edison Company held a private certificate of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Utility Commission empowering it to deliver electricity. Id at
346.
38. Id at 346-48.
39. The provision provided that Metropolitan had the right to discontinue service to a
customer on "reasonable notice of non-payment of bills." Id at 346 (footnote omitted).
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with Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections despite the fact
that Metropolitan Edison was subject to extensive regulation.
The Jackson Court made three important state action determina-

tions in response to arguments that the procedural due process rights of
Mrs. Jackson were violated. First, the Court held that the fact that

Metropolitan Edison is a state sanctioned monopoly4" operating in the
public interest 4 does not entail a finding that its termination of service
was state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 42 The Court
also rejected the argument that the state had authorized the termination
practice because such practice was permitted by Metropolitan Edison's

general tariff filed with the Public Utility Commission, reasoning that
although the practice may have been approved by the commission,
"where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the

proposed practice by ordering it" 43 the practice does not become transmuted into that of the state.' Secondly, and notwithstanding the claim
of the Jackson majority to the contrary, the Court proceded by serially

analyzing and distinguishing the three factors of monopoly, regulation

and public function. 45 This is a substantial departure from the rule of
Burton which requires that all the factors are looked at together in

making the state action determination. Lastly, and most importantly,
the Court in Jackson emphasizes that the state must actually be involved in the particular activity that is challenged: i.e., the termination

practices in Jackson. The Court, by its own language, suggests a new
and highly restrictive test for the finding of state action: "the inquiry
40. Monopoly status was assumed by the Court for the sake of argument, though there
was question whether Metropolitan Edison was granted or guaranteed a monopoly by the
state. Id at 351.
41. Under the "public function" doctrine, state action is present because the private
entity provides an essential public service-the private entity exercising powers traditionally
reserved to the state. However in this case the Court explained, "Pennsylvania Courts have
rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a
municipal duty." Id at 352-53.
The Court concluded that simply because the business of Metropolitan Edison is affected with a public interest, its actions are not converted into those of the state. "Doctors,
optometrists, lawyers, [and] Metropolitan. . . are all in regulated businesses, providing arguably essential goods and services, 'affected with a public interest.' We do not believe that
such a status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State." Id at 354.
42. Id at 351-54.
43. Id at 357.
44. This is more restrictive than Moose Lodge. In the one exception to the Court's
refusal to find state action in Moose Lodge, the Court enjoined enforcement of a state regulation that required the Lodge to adhere to its bylaws where the bylaws of the Lodge were
discriminatory. See Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 and note 33, supra. The type of
state action struck down in Moose Lodge is analogous to the state authorization of Metropolitan Edison's termination of services practices in Jackson. However, the Jackson court
held that such authorization was not state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 419
U.S. at 357.
45. 419 U.S. 345, 362-72 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Quinn, supra note 17 at 163.
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must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State
so that the latter may be
and the challenged action of the . . . entity
46
fairly treated as that of the State itself."
In his dissent, Justice Douglas recognized the change in the test
made by the majority. He examined the factors of state involvement in
the aggregate, which is consistent with the theory of "general involvement" in the private entity, to support a finding of state action as articulated in Burton. He also examined state involvement in the
termination procedure separately, consistent with the theory of state
involvement in the challenged activity, to justify a finding of state action as developed by the majority in Moose Lodge and Jackion.47
Douglas warned against the change in approach by the court, and explained that "[tihough the Court pays lip service to the need for assessing the totality of the State's involvement in this enterprise . . .its
underlying analysis is fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative."48 Thus the Court makes a significant departure from previous
treatment of the state action issue.
The facts of Jackson, involving monopoly power, extensive state
regulation and an essential public service, combine to make the strongest showing of state action in the entire line of state action cases. Accompanied by the rationale developed in Burton, the Jackson facts
appear ideally suited for subjecting the private entity involved to the
state action doctrine and the accompanying Fourteenth Amendment
requirements. But the Burton theory of general involvement seems to
have been replaced by the Jackson decision's theory of involvement by
the state in the specific activity complained of, and under Jackson it
has become much more difficult to subject a formally private activity to
Fourteenth Amendment requirements.
B. Finding state action in the hospital: the public-private distinction
In determining whether state action exists in a hospital's activities,
the crucial inquiry is whether the hospital is to be classified as "public"
or "private". Although there is no precise definition of what makes a
hospital public such that its actions are subject to the precepts of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a general definition of the public-private distinction was set forth by the court in Shulman v. Washington Hospital
46. 419 U.S. at 351.
47. It was Justice Douglas' opinion that under either theory a finding of state action was
supported. He explained that Metropolitan Edison's actions and its termination of service
provisions "are sufficiently intertwined with those of the State,. . . to warrant a holding that
• . .[Metropolitan's] actions in terminating this householder's service were 'state action' for
the purpose of giving federal jurisdiction over... [Metropolitan] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
Id at 362 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. Id at 362-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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A public hospital, as its very name implies, is one owned, maintained and operated by a governmental unit. . . and supported
by governmental funds. . . A private hospital is one that is
owned, maintained and operated by a corporation or an individ-

ual without any participation on the part of any governmental

agency in its control.","o
This definition represents the absolutes: the publicly operated hospital and the strictly private one. Yet, in this modern era of technical
and therefore expensive health care, it is almost impossible for a hospital to be completely private in its ownership, operation and funding.
Government grants are necessary for the survival of the modem hospital and the concommitant regulation by government is increasingly
pervasive. It is this local, state and federal assistance and involvement
with formally private hospitals that provides the basis on which a court
could decide that public involvement has become so great that the private hospital should be subjected to public treatment. 5 1 The remainder
of this section is concerned with determining when such public involvement is present.
. A selective look at how thefederal courts have dealt with Supreme
Court state action decisions
In Mulvihill v. Julia L. Buttefield Memorial Hospital,2 decided
prior to Moose Lodge and Jackson, the court for the Southern District
of New York applied a nexus test as applied by the Supreme Court in
Jackson. Faced with a physician's claim of denial of due process in
nonreappointment to hospital staff privileges, the court stated that,
[i]t is true that the state has 'insinuated itself' [Burton test] into
some aspects of the functioning of. . . [the hospital]. But there is
no charge here that the state in any way encouraged, promoted,
supported, or associated itself with the hospital's rules and methods for choosing physicians. The State did not approve the hospital's internal bylaws; nor did any state nominee sit on the
hospital' board of trustees."53
The court thus found no involvement by the state in the particular conduct in issue.
In Barrett v. United Hospital,4 decided after Moose Lodge but
49. 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.C. 1963), afd,348 F.2.d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
50. Id at 61.
51. The problem being dealt with in this section is when the private hospital has sufficient governmental involvement to term its actions those of the state for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Hospitals run by governmental entities are clearly public and will not be
discussed further.
52. 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
53. Id at 1024.
54. 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974).
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prior to Jackson, the same district court, now supported in its Mulvihill
decision by the Supreme Court, decided to go further and developed a

strict three pronged test, each element of which must be met before
private conduct is subject to constitutional limitations: (1) the state's
involvement with the private institution must be "significant", (2) the
state must be involved with the activity that caused the injury, and (3)

"the State's involvement must aid, encourage or connote approval of
the complained of activity."" The first prong is the Burton test, the

second is the nexus requirement and the third is an additional requirethe involvement be specifically supportive of the challenged
ment that
56
activity.

In the 1976 case of Briscoe v. Brock,5 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit followed the Jackson nexus approach." Although the
hospital in Briscoe received federal and other public funds, enjoyed a
tax exempt status and was subject to state regulation, the court refused
to find state action. "[T]here is no such nexus between the state's rela-

tionship to the Hospital's operation and the dismissal of the plaintiff as
attribution of the challenged action of the Hospital to the
to justify
59

State."1
Not all courts have decided to follow the Supreme Court trend.
The district court for the District of Connecticut in Schlein v. Milford
Hospital6" rejected the strict Jackson test and followed the rationale of
Burton. The court found state action by virtue of a license given to the

hospital by the state which permitted the hospital authority to deter-

mine the scope of the license required of a physician. 6' After noting

the Jackson and Moose Lodge decisions Judge Newman stated: "I am
not persuaded that they (these cases) make resolution of the state action

issues in this case automatic. It is 'only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances (that) the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
55. Id at 797.
56. The language of this third test seems similar to the Court's statement in Jackson
that the fact that the termination procedure was included in the general tariff approved by
the state was not sufficient to connect it to the challenged activity because the state had not
ordered it. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) and discussion
connected with note 42 supra.
57. 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976).
58. The court emphasized the Jackson rationale that there is no required finding of
state action merely because the corporation is chartered by the state, is a state conferred
monopoly, is regulated by the state, or performs functions of public convenience and necessity. Rather, there must be a nexus between the state and the challenged action of the entity.
Id at 395.
59. Id at 395-96. See Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69, 73 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
60. 423 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1976).
61. Id at 543. See also the first district court decision of the same case, Schlein v.
Milford Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 1263, 1264 (D. Conn. 1974).
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conduct can be attributed its true significance.' ,62
With the possible exception of Hill-Burton funding, which will be
discussed in the following subsection, the courts generally agree that no
particular factor by itself leads to a finding of state action, although a
combination of factors may lead to such a finding. Automatic findings
of state action have not been made when a hospital receives compensation for indigents,6 3 Medicare funds, 64 or other governmental financial
assistance. 65 These holdings are consistent with the Mfoose Lodge and
Jackson approach. However, a court following the Burton approach
would examine these factors cumulatively and it might decide that they
form a sufficient basis for finding state action. Also, following Jackson,
courts have held that the mere existence of state regulation does not
convert the action of the hospital into that of the state without a specific
connection between the challenged act and the form of state regulation.6 6 Finally, the argument that because a hospital performs a public
function its actions are attributable to the State, has been accepted by
at least one court which relied solely upon this doctrine to find state
action where the hospital was the only one in the area.6 7 Other courts
have not been so generous in this regard, holding that a hospital is
neither a public utility nor a public calling. 68 In light of the language in
Jackson that the mere "status" of performing a public function does
not of itself convert private actions into those of the state, 69 it is doubtful that the public function theory retains enough weight to warrant a
finding of state action by an otherwise private hospital for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes. It is, however, a factor that can combine with
others previously mentioned to support such a finding.
2. Hill-Burtonfunding
The greatest amount of litigation concerning the question of when
a hospital is deemed to be public has revolved around the effect that the
receipt of funds under the Hospital Survey and Construction Act has
62. 423 F. Supp. at 542 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961)).
63. Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963).
64. Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 675-76 (10th Cir. 1973); Doyle v. Unicare
Health Serv., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69, 74 (N.D. IlI. 1975); Slavcoff v. Harrisburg Polyclinic
Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 999, 1003-04 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
65. Doyle v. Unicare Health Serv., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69, 74 (N.D. 111. 1975).
66. Id at 73; Barrio v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 317, 320 (S.D. II1. 1974);
Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mulvihill v. Butterfield
Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 1971).
67. Meredith v. Allen County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 35 (6th Cir.
1968).
68. See Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 62 (D.D.C. 1963).
69. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,354 (1974); Doyle v. Unicare
Health Serv., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 69, 74 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
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on private hospitals.7" The purpose of the legislation, popularly known
as the Hill-Burton Act, is to provide states with money to assist in the
construction and modernization of public and private hospitals, develop new and improved medical facilities and promote research.7
Under the Act the state submits its plan for use of the federal funds
based on federal regulations which set forth the priority of projects to
be funded.72 A state agency receives and administers the funds according to federal regulations and recipient hospitals must comply with federal standards of operation which are enforced by the state.73 Thus
Hill-Burton funding involves both federal and state regulation, as well
as federal and state financial aid.
Although courts have determined that the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds is relevant to a finding of state action and, accordingly, certain
Fourteenth Amendment rights, "the Act itself', in the words of one
court, "creates no personal rights or causes of action as such, nor does it
confer jurisdiction on federal courts of controversies involving civil or
other personal rights." 74 Therefore, the receipt of the funds does not
justify a finding of state action in a hospital.
The Fourth Circuit has been adamant in its view that mere receipt
of Hill-Burton funds constitutes sufficient state action to require otherwise private hospitals to act in conformity with the Fourteenth Amendment. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital,7 5 the first major

case to so hold, involved discrimination by two hospitals in denying the
use of staff facilities to black physicians and dentists solely on the basis
of race. Both hospitals financed certain projects with Hill-Burton
funds. 76 The court concluded that "the necessary 'degree of state [in
the broad sense, including federal] participation and involvement' is
present as a result of the participation by the defendants in the HillBurton program. The massive use of public funds and extensive state70. Hospital Survey and Construction Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291m (1974). See generally Cronin, PrivateHospitalsthatReceive PublicFunds Under the Hill-BurtonProgram: The
State Action Implications, 12 NORTHEASTERN L. REV. 525 (1977) for a thorough discussion
of the effect of Hill-Burton funds on finding state action in all of the federal circuits.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291(a)-291(c) (1974).
72. The regulations are promulgated by the Surgeon General with the approval of the
Federal Hospital Council and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. 42 U.S.C.
§ 291c (1974).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 291d (1974).
74. Don v. Okmulgee Mem. Hosp., 443 F.2d 234, 235 (10th Cir. 1971). The Act itself
expressly states: "[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed as conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or operation of any facility with respect to which any funds
have been or may be expended under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1974).
75. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S 938 (1964).
76. Id at 963.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:217

federal sharing in the common plan are all relevant factors." 7 The
court noted that not all forms of governmental involvement automatically amount to state action; rather, it is the character and functioning
of the Hill-Burton program that requires the finding of state action.78
Using language parallel to that employed in Burton, the Court found
significant contact and the requisite degree of state participation in the
hospitals' activity; these hospitals "operate as integral parts of comprehensive joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or programs
designed to effect a proper allocation of available medical and hospital
resources for the best possible promotion and maintenance of public
health."7 9
In Sams v. Ohio Valley GeneralHosfpitalAssociation,0 the Fourth
Circuit reaffirmed its Simkins position. Physicians had been denied

staff privileges due to a hospital rule that required staff physicians to

practice and have an office within the county.8 The court found that
the rule was unjustly discriminatory and required the hospital, on ac-

count of its receipt of Hill-Burton funds, to comply with constitutional
requirements in setting forth rules for staff admission.8"
77. Id at 967 (footnote omitted).
78. Id
79. Id
80. 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969).
81. Id at 827.
82. The court explained: "[Slubstantial Federal moneys invited and flowing into the
defendant hospitals under the Hill-Burton Act entail, in return, obligations of observance of
Federal constitutional mandates. Disregard of them is State action, for the act trusts the
State to maintain a fair and just governance of these hospitals accepting the aid of the legislation." Id at 828. A second feature of the Sams decision is that it extended a state action
finding, due to mere receipt of Hill-Burton funds, to a case where the involved discrimination was not racial. It has been observed that the courts seem to require a lesser degree of
state involvement to support a finding of state action in racial discrimination cases. The
United States Supreme Court has rejected this view. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, the court in Barrett v.
United Hosp. 376 F. Supp. 791, 797-98 (S.D.N.Y.) aff'd 562 F.2d 1395 (2nd Cir. 1974),
recognized this double standard when finding state action in the Second Circuit. In Sams,
the court announced that the constitutional principles set forth in Simkins were to apply "in
full strength" to non-racial issues. 413 F.2d at 828. The reasoning of the district court in the
Sams case was emphatic on this point, explaining that there is "no logical reason for distinguishing . . . a case where non-Negroes seek redress for the possible deprivation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights. . . . If a hospital's involvement in the Hill-Burton program
denotes 'state action' in the one case, then, as this Court has determined, it must also do so in
the other. In neither case does the finding of 'state action' rest upon what group the plaintiffs
are members or of what 'state action' discrimination they specifically complain." Sams v.
Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 257 F. Supp. 369, 371 (N.D.W. Va. 1966).
In the subsequent case of Mulvihill v. Julia Butterfield Mem. Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), the court tried to distinguish both Simkins and Sams. This case involved
denial of due process in nonreappointment of a physician in accordance with the hospital's
bylaws. The court explained that both of the Fourth Circuit cases dealt with "state support
to a hospital which arbitrarily denied its facilities to a segment of the population." Id at
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Finally, in Christhi/f v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association,83 the Fourth Circuit found state action due to receipt of Hill-Burton funds and required a hospital to apply the Fourteenth Amendment
whose privileges were terminated
procedural protections to a physician
84
without affording him due process.
Notwithstanding the unequivocal position of the Fourth Circuit,
several theories have been used to find that the receipt of Hill-Burton
funds is not sufficient in itself to constitute state action in the hospital.
Initially, some courts refuse to find state action due merely to receipt of
the funds because there is an insufficient "nexus" between regulation
due to such receipt and the internal policy decisions in medical staff
selection procedures. Moreover, a few courts suggest, even in the absence of a direct nexus between governmental regulation and staff selection procedures, that Hill-Burton funding in combination with other
1023-24. The court hypothesized that there would not have been a finding of state action if
the hospitals involved had discharged an employee without notice of a hearing, as opposed
to an arbitrary discrimination against a certain group of people. The Sams lower court
opinion made it clear that this is not a valid distinction, holding that the Hill-Burton program denotes state action irrespective of the group complaining or the discrimination complained of. Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 257 F. Supp. 369, 371 (N.D.W. Va.
1966).
83. 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974).
84. Id The Fourth Circuit has held fast in its Hill-Burton theory. See Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975) (anti-abortion policy); Duffield
v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974) (improper withdrawal of
hospital staff privileges). But see Large v. Reynolds, 414 F. Supp. 45 (W.D. Va. 1976) where
the Fourth Circuit's decisions were questioned. "The Court finds state action on this basis
[Hill-Burton funding], although such a funding seems tenuous in light of the recent Supreme
Court Decision in Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S. Ct. 449, 42 L. Ed.
2d 477 (1974). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently failed to resolve the dispute between the Circuit Courts over this issue, Greco v. OrangeMemorialHospitalCorp., 513 F.2d
873 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000,. . . (1975) (See dissent to denial of cert., J.
White), therefore, Fourth Circuit Pronouncements on on this issue are still binding on this
court." Id at 46.
The First Circuit seems to have followed the Fourth Circuit holding, Bricker v. Sceva
Speare Mem Hosp., 339 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.N.H. 1972). A district court in the Third
Circuit at first followed the Fourth Circuit precedent in Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313
F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1970). But this district has subsequently come to the opposite
conclusion. See Holton v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 419 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Pa.
1976); Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hosp., 413 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
See also Slavcoffv. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 999 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Ozlu v.
Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
85. See Briscoe v. Brock, 540 F.2d 392, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1976); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp., 507 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1974) (The court said: "The appellant cites us to
no regulation. . . that authorizes the State of California or the federal government to participate in the appointment of medical doctors to the staff. . ."); Barrett v. United Hosp.,
376 F. Supp. 791, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (the Court said: "In the case at bar the financial aid is
directed toward promoting construction of new hospital wings and has no nexus with the
employment and termination policies applied with regard to staff.").
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earlier in this section, might be suffifactors, such as those mentioned
86
cient for a state action finding.
Lastly, at least one court has relied upon sections of the Hill-Burton Act itself to preclude a finding of state action. In Santurfv. Sopes s7
the court states that § 291m of the Hospital Survey and Construction
Act 88 was written purposefully, and it very clearly establishes that the
Federal Government did not intend to have any influence whatsoever
in the operation of any hospital . . . [receiving Hill-Burton funds].
Had it been otherwise, unquestionably the Congress would have said
SO. "89

In conclusion, the criterion for finding state action in the formally
private hospital is far from certain.9" There is uncertainty as to which
test to apply: a general involvement or a "nexus" test, as well as uncertainty as to the extent of governmental involvement required under either test. Despite the uncertainties that remain, the trend of the
Supreme Court is to require a direct, albeit causal, connection between
the activities of the state and the challenged activity of the private entity. Increasingly, the physician will find it difficult to prove state action by a private hospital in order to invoke Fourteenth Amendment
procedural protections of his staff privileges. The physician who practices in a public hospital operated by a governmental entity receives
86. See Don v. Okmulgee Mem. Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971); Berrios v. Mem.
Hosp., 403 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Tenn. 1975); Barrio v. McDonough Dist. Hosp., 377 F Supp.
317 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C. 1963).
87. 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), aftd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 977 (1965).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 291m (1974).
89. 224 F. Supp. at 89 1. The theory is of dubious merit. The Church Amendment, 87
Stat. 91 § 401 (1973), specifically prohibits a finding of state action due to Hill-Burton funding in abortion and sterilization cases. It can be argued that by'singling out abortion cases
Congress implicitly approved judicial decisions finding state action due to Hill-Burton funding in the staff privilege context.
90. The conflicts in the district and circuit courts have been recognized by Justice
White, who believes that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a Hill-Burton case
and establish a uniform role. See Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948
(1976) (White, J., dissenting); Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1000 (1975) (White, J., dissenting). In his dissent to the denial of cert. in Taylor, Justice
White said, "[H]ospitals receiving Hill-Burton funds in the Fourth Circuit are subject to
very different rules as a matter of federal law than are similar hospitals in at least four other
Circuits. [6th, 7th, 9th and 10th]. This Court, should not, consistent with a responsible
exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, permit such conflicts on important points of federal law
to remain unresolved." 424 U.S. at 949 (White, J., dissenting). Greco dealt with the right to
abortions. Due to vociferous public opinion on both sides of the abortion issue, it may be
that the Court is denying certiorari in Hill-Burton cases because a finding of state action
would force the otherwise private hospital to perform elective abortions, contrary to a moral
belief of its governing body. A hospital staff privileges case brought to the Court for determination of the state action issue would be a better candidate for Supreme Court acceptance.
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full due process protection of his staff privileges, while the physician
practicing in the private hospital despite public funding and regulation
of its operation, has no such protections.
II. Requirements to be Met in Order to Invoke Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process-Liberty or Property
Interest
The Fourteenth Amendment due process protections do not extend to all state actions, but only to those that can be said to deprive
"life, liberty, or property."9 The types of liberty and property interests
that courts have found deserving of protection extend far beyond the
normal meanings of the terms: freedom from physical restraint and
ownership of physical objects and real property.92 In the context of
Fourteenth Amendment considerations, these terms now include, "the
right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental interference."93 Judicial
interpretation of liberty and property interests as they relate to the physician's staff privileges is the subject of this section.
A. Liberty Interest
"Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." 94 Thus the Supreme Court in
the leading case of Boardof Regents v. Roth95 included an individual's
personal reputation within the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roth a nontenured teacher at a state university
was not rehired, allegedly in retaliation for his open criticism of school
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. "The Court has ... made clear that the property interests protected by procedural
due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972) citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U S.
207, 208 (1971) (employment conditional on swearing to oath); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits).
"By the same token, the Court has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial
segregation); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (fitness as parent). See generally
Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977); Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property " Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Comment, The Growth ofProceduralDue ProcessInto 4 New
Substance. An ExpandingProtectionforPersonalLibertyanda "SpecializedType ofProperty
...in our Economic System", 66 Nw. L. REV. 502 (1971).
93. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
94. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
95. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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policies. The court dealt with the issue of whether Roth had such a
liberty or property interest at stake that due process would be required
prior to a non-reappointment decision.9 6
The Court ruled that infringement of a liberty interest would require the possibility of seriously damaging the individual's standing
and associations in his community or an imposition of a stigma or other
disability that would foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.97 Since the University made no charge
against Roth that would damage his standing or reputation in the community and no stigma limited his possibilities for future employment,
the Court found no liberty interest at stake. "It stretches the concept
too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is
not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another."9' 8
In Paul v. Davis,99 the Court held that a reputation alone is not
protected within the liberty concept of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1 0° In Paul the plaintiff's name and picture were included in a police flyer of "active shoplifters." His suit alleged that the
defamation was a deprivation of liberty protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 ' In holding that reputation
alone is not constitutionally protected, the Court stated that such protection may be offered only if a previously recognized right or status
"was distinctly altered or extinguished" as a result of state action.'0 2
The Supreme Court appears to be narrowing the scope of the liberty
interest entitled to protection and as a result of Paul v. Davis, injury to
reputation must be coupled with a more tangible loss of a right or a
status in order to constitute a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the Roth definition, infringement of a liberty interest requires an individual to be the victim of an action which may seriously
damage his standing or associations in his community or impose a
stigma limiting his possibilities for future employment. Because professional standing is intimately tied to the practice of medicine, a liberty interest could be found to be at stake in staff privileges cases
96. Id at 574.
97. Id at 573.
98. Id at 575. The Court noted that non-retention of a job may make the individual
"somewhat less attractive to some other employers", but that this -would hardly establish
the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of 'liberty'." Id at 574
n.13.
99. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). See Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process-Availabilityof FederalRemedies-Reputation as a ProtectedInterest, 60 MARQ. L.
Rav. 162 (1976).
100. 424 U.S. at 712.
101. Id at 695-97.
102. Id at 711.
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involving charges that damage the physician's professional standing.10 3

Several lower federal courts have dealt with the physician's liberty
interest in staff privileges determinations. In Hoberman v. Lock Haven
Hospital,0 4 the court held that an unspecified physician charged with
conduct "incompatible with good medical care and acceptable professional behavior," was deprived of an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.105 The court concluded that due to the small size
of the medical staff it was "well known that the memorandum [contain10 6
ing the charges] was directed towards him [the specific physician]."'
In Schlein v. Milford Hospital,10 7 a rejection of application for

privileges case, the court questioned the existence of a protected liberty
interest where no direct charge was made. In that case, the physician
alleged that the mere rejection of privileges was a "blemish" and "scar"
upon his record that would limit his "liberty to pursue his occupation." 08 The court thus made a proper distinction; mere rejection of an
application for privileges where no charges are directed against the
physician does not affect the liberty interest. Rejection may be due to
the fact that the hospital already has several doctors practicing the ap-

plicant's specialty or some other reason that would have no harmful
effect on the physician's reputation and professional standing.
At least one court has dealt with the physician's liberty interest
since the Supreme Court decision in Paulv. Davis. In Stretten v. Wadsworth VeteransHospital,"9 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Davis decision to mean that a liberty interest was not infringed when the only
loss suffered is a "stigma" or damage to reputation. The court did not
alter the Roth holding that "when the individual has suffered a tangible
loss a liberty interest is implicated only when the state makes a 'charge

against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations
103. Therefore the Roth statement that governmental charges against the individual that
may seriously damage his standing and association in the community give rise to recognition
of a liberty interest (408 U.S. at 573) is consistent with Paul v. Davis. In Roth, had defamation been shown, it would have been a defamation in the course of the decision to decline
rehiring, which would have amounted to an injury to reputation coupled with the tangible
loss of his employment status. If injury to one's reputation can be shown, the Paul v. Davis
requirement will always be met where the damage to reputation is tied to an employment
interest. See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) in which no liberty interest existed
where the reasons for discharge of the employee were not made public. There is no stigma
in such a situation even though the charges or reasons were false. "The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel
decisions." .d at 350.
104. 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
105. Id at 1185.
106. Id
107. 423 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1976).
108. Id at 543 n.l.
109. 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976).
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in his community.' [quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573]. . . ."I" Since deprivation of staff privileges would be a tangible loss, though not necessarily a protected property interest, the Paul v. Davis decision should
present no barrier to the physician's claim."'
B.

Property Interest

The Roth case also sets forth the standards for finding a property
interest in connection with employment. The theory behind Roth is
that the "Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is
a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits."" 2 Therefore, "[t]o have a property interest
in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or
desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 113 The
Court explained that the creation and scope of the property interest is
defined by independent and existing understandings or rules that secure the benefits." 4 Thus, Roth's property interest was created and defined by his contract of employment with the university. Since its terms
specifically provided that Roth's employment would terminate at the
end of a year and there were no provisions for contract renewal, there
was no interest in re-employment and no property interest sufficient to
invoke the Fourteenth Amendment was found to exist." 5 Thus, inquiry into a property interest in employment begins with the terms of
the employment agreement. The issue is whether there is a status, rule,
policy or term that 6creates a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment." 1
InArnett v. Kennedy" 7 six members of the Court, in separate opinions with none holding a majority," 18 concluded that a property interest
110. Id at 365.
111. Cf. Note, ConstitutionalLaw-FourteenthAmendment Due Process-Availabiliy of
FederalRemedies-Reutation as a ProtectedInterest, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 162 (1976), which

reasons that as a result of the Paul v. Davis decision "an injury to one's reputation must be
tied to either a liberty interest in being free from . . . stigmatization or a property interest
before it is cognizable under section 1983." Id at 169.
112. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
113. Id at 577.
114. Id

115. Id. at 578.
116. In the companion case to Roth of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the
Court found that although there was no formal tenure system and Perry was hired from year
to year, he had a legitimate claim of entitlement to renewal of his contract due to a "defacto
tenure program" based on rules and understandings fostered by the college administration.
Id at 599-601.
117. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
118. Powell was joined by Blackmun concurring in part, White concurring in part and
dissenting in part, Marshall dissenting, Douglas dissenting, and Brennan dissenting.
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in employment was entitled to constitutional protection where the employee could only be discharged for "cause". The terms of the agreement therefore implied continued employment in the absence of cause
for dismissal and that such dismissal must be accompanied by procedural due process protections.
In Bishop v. Wood" 9 the Roth doctrine was applied to a case
where the employee held his position "'at the will and pleasure of the
city.' "20 The Court found no property interest in employment since
the employment agreement allowed the city to arbitrarily terminate
employment at any time.12' Thus the employee had no expectation of
continued employment.
Hospital bylaws normally provide that privileges are to be granted
for a specified term, usually one or two years.' 22 Therefore the physician has a legitimate claim of entitlement to staff privileges for this period of time, and he has a right not to be removed from the staff
without procedural due process protections. 123 Revocation without due
process being afforded would be a deprivation of a property interest. 24
Appointment and reappointment proceedings do not, however, require
Fourteenth Amendment procedural protections. Since hospital bylaws
provide that staff privileges shall last for a specified period, the physician has a legitimate claim of entitlement to privileges only for the term
specified and failure to reappoint him after this term
5 has elapsed does
not constitute infringement of a property interest.'1
Under Roth the physician has no property interest in initial appointment to staff privileges because he has no "legitimate claim of entitlement" to them. No such claim exists because there is no
constitutional right to practice medicine in a hospital: hospital administrators are entitled to impose qualifications on those whom they select
to practice within their hospital.' 2 6 If refusal of privileges is arbitrary
or unreasonable an action may lie against the hospital, but a court will
119. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
120. Id at 345 n.8.
121. Id at 345.
122. See Part III, infra, for detailed discussion of hospital staff bylaws.
123. See Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n of St. Louis, 523 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1975).
124. See Don v. Okmulgee Mem. Hosp., 443 F.2d 234, 238 (10th Cir. 1971); Poe v. Charlotte Mem. Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
125. Contra Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971). "Once having become a member of the hospital surgical staff Dr. Woodbury had a right to reappointment
until the governing authorities determined after a hearing conforming to the minimum requirements of procedural due process that he did not meet the reasonable standards of the
hospital." Id at 842. The fact that the case was decided before Roth may leave doubt as to
whether it would be decided the same way today.
126. Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971); Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437
F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971).
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not interfere "so long as staff selections are administered with fairness,
responsibility, and
geared by a rationale compatible with hospital
' 127
unencumbered with irrelevant considerations."
In summary, a physician will be able to assert deprivation of a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment whenever a
charge is made against him that could adversely affect his professional
standing in connection with determination of his staff privileges. The
physician will be able to assert a property interest only where he is
threatened with revocation of his privileges. Current constitutional law
therefore leaves the physician's staff privileges largely unprotected
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court requires an
individual to have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a right before a
property interest in that right may be asserted. This restrictive approach severely narrows application of the Fourteenth Amendment.
III.

The California Approach

The California courts have been diligent in their protection of
physicians' hospital staff privileges. These courts have expanded the
scope of judicial review of staff privileges decisions and have developed
a common law right of fair procedure that must be followed in the
course of staff privileges determinations. The California approach is a
sensible one, offering an excellent alternative to the complications involved in attempting to invoke constitutional due process. This section
will discuss the development and present scope of these doctrines, as
well as the reasons which indicate the approach is a sound alternative.
The first case to deal with hospital staff privileges determinations
in California was Wyatt v. Tahoe ForestHospitalDistrict.2 8 In Wyatt,
the court discussed the theory that a body ascertaining facts that may
affect the right to engage in a professional practice 29 performs a quasijudicial function, 3 ° holding the theory applicable to hospitals. This
rule originated in cases involving license grants, and the Wyatt court
analogized a physician's staff privileges to a "special license" that must
be obtained in order to practice in the hospital.' 3 1 Due to the quasijudicial character of a staff privilege proceeding it must be fair, unarbitrary and based on sufficient evidence. Thus the applicant for staff
privileges "has the right to a hearing to determine whether or not his
127. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1971).
128. 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959).
129. The court placed special emphasis on the fact that in modem society "a physician or
surgeon who is not permitted to practice his profession in a hospital is as a practical matter
denied the right to fully practice his profession." Id at 715, 345 P.2d at 97.
130. Id at 716, 345 P.2d at 97.
131. Id
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qualifications meet the requirements established by law." '3 2 Certain
due process protections must, therefore, be afforded the applicant for

staff privileges in a public hospital. The Wyatt rule was extended to
private hospitals in Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association.133 In this case the California Supreme Court rejected the contention that private hospitals have absolute discretion to exclude doctors

possibility of a suit for damages resulting
from membership "without
1 34
from the exclusion."
The landmark California case was Ascherman v. San Francisco
q y 35 [hereinafter cited as Ascherman 11. Dr. Ascherman
Medical Sociel
sued four hospitals alleging that they either dismissed him from their

staff, refused him admission to their staff, or refused him use of hospital
facilities, without affording him due process of law or following their
own bylaws. 136 The defendant hospitals asserted as their defense the

general rule that a private hospital may use its discretion to exclude a
physician from its staff, as long as the decision is not arbitrary or capricious.

13 7

The Court of Appeal did not accept this argument and held

that a physician may not be deprived of staff privileges without minimal due process protection, regardless of whether the hospital is public
or private. 138 The court abolished the public-private state action distinction in California basing its decision on two theories. First, the

court compared the California Health & Safety Code sections governing public hospitals with the Business & Professions Code sections
governing private hospitals.' 39 The similarity of these statutes led the
132. Id
133. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
134. Id at 810-11, 376 P.2d at 570-71, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 642-43. The court reasoned that
the "burden of defending suits cannot warrant denial of relief to one injured by wholly
unjustifiable conduct ...."
135. 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974).
136. Id at 629-31, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 683-85. Dr. Ascherman also sued others, including
the San Francisco Medical Society, alleging conspiracy to interfere with his practice.
137. Id at 640-41, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 691. See also Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp.
Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810-11; 376 P.2d 567, 570-71; 26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642-43 (1962).
138. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 648, 114 Cal. Reptr. at 696.
139. Public hospitals are governed by the Local Hospital District Law, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 32000-32492 (West 1970). Section 32128 provides that rules to govern the
operation of the hospital be established by the board of directors and include (I) provision
for the organization of physicians who are permitted to practice in the hospital into a formal
medical staff, with officers and bylaws and staff appointment on an annual or biennial basis,
(2) provision for procedure of appointment and reappointment, and (3) rules of the hospital
shall meet standards not less than the rules and standards of private or voluntary hospitals
within the same district.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2392.5 (West 1973) governs the private hospital and is practically the same as § 32128 of the Health & Safety Code. It provides that it is unprofessional
not to have rules goverining the operation of a hospital having five or more physicians. The
provisions that must be included are almost identical to § 32128, except that § 2392.5 adds
that membership is restricted to physicians competent in their respective fields, worthy in
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court to conclude that the California legislature intended public and
private hospitals to be governed by the same criteria and in an identical

manner. Second, the Court applied the rule of Pinsker v. Pac!fc Coast
Society of Orthodontists 40 [hereinafter cited as Pinsker1] that a private
entity "does not have absolute discretion to deprive a person of a substantial right." 4 '
In PinskerI, which was explained and expanded in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists'4 2 [hereinafter cited as Pinsker I1]
the California Supreme Court held that membership in the defendant

orthodontic society was a practical necessity for a dentist wishing to
specialize in orthodontics. The court found a public interest in the

membership decisions of the society due to its "virtual monopoly" in
establishing membership standards. Thus, the court observed that the

society had a fiduciary responsibility in accepting or rejecting membership applications. The court reasoned that "an applicant for membership has a judicially enforceable right to have his application
considered in a manner comporting with the fundamentals of due proc144
ess."' 43 As Pinsker II explains, this is a right found at common law.
It began as a principle of judicial review of expulsions from membership 4 5 and was extended to exclusions from membership in private asin such a way
sociations which monopolized their field of employment
146
that membership was an "economic necessity."
character and in professional ethics. See Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 646-47, 114 Cal.
Rptr. at 695-96.
140. 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969).
141. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 696. See also Randone v.
Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971). cert. denied, 407 U.S.
924 (1972) where a unanimous Supreme Court noted that "California courts have long preserved the individual's right to notice and a meaningful hearing in instances in which a
significant deprivation is threatened by a private entity, as well as by a governmental body."
Id at 550-51 n.ll, 488 P.2d at 22 n.ll, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718 n.ll (emphasis in original).
142. 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974).
143. Pinsker I, 1 Cal. 3d at 166, 460 P.2d at 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
144. "Thus, PinskerI constitutes only the latest development in a century-old progression of common law decisions establishing the proper role which courts should play with
respect to membership decisions reached by private associations. Throughout this progression, the authorities indicate that once it is determined that judicial scrutiny of a particular
decision is justified to protect against arbitrary action, such overview includes an evaluation
of both the substantive and procedural aspects of the association's decision." Pinsker II, 12
Cal. 3d at 552, 526 P.2d at 261, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
145. This doctrine was recognized in California as early as 1888. See Pinsker II, 12 Cal.
3d at 550-51 n.8, 526 P.2d at 260 n.8, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 252 n.8, for a historical survey of the
cases in California.
146. Id at 551, 526 P.2d at 260, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 252. Much of the court's historical data
is gathered from Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791
(196 1), the first important state decision to grant judicial review of a professional association's rejection of an application for membership. In making its decision it canvassed the
historical development of judicial decisions in the field, and is a helpful reference in tracing
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Thus, Pinsker I did not limit procedural fairness requirements to
expulsion from private association membership but extended those

protections to exclusions from such memberships where the test of economic necessity is met. Under this test, the private association must

have the power to affect the individual's right to practice his profession
as a result of its membership decisions.
Ascherman I significantly expanded the Pinsker I theory. First,

the doctrine that an organization exercises a quasi-judicial function
and so its membership decisions are subjected to minimal due process 14 7 was extended to the hospital staff privileges decision, for both
public and private hospitals.' 48 Second, Ascherman I narrowed the re-

quirement of showing a monopoly of employment by the association.
In Ascherman I the defendant hospitals argued that since no monopoly

was involved there should be no requirement that their bylaws provide
a right to a hearing before a physician can be deprived or denied staff

privileges. They argued that past California cases dealt only with professional societies which exerted a monopoly power over the applicant's
right to practice his profession. Such professional societies were quite
unlike the defendant hospitals, it was argued, which exercised no mo-

nopolistic control over Dr. Ascherman's right to practice his profession.

They were only four of many hospitals in the city.' 4 9 The court specifically rejected the notion that pervasive monopoly power need be
shown. It stated that the evidence showed that Dr. Ascherman suffered
economic loss due to his exclusion from staff privileges and he was
the origin of the doctrine. Falconerelied heavily on the California case of James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944) which held that a union that has attained a
monopoly of the supply of labor occupies a quasi-public position in that its right to choose
members affects the fundamental right to work for a living and it has corresponding obligations not to exercise its power arbitrarily or unreasonably, applying the common law principles of fair procedure to a private association's exclusion from membership actions. Id at
731-32, 155 P.2d at 335. Falcone applied the Marinshop doctrine and rationale to a medical
society with a virtual monopoly over the use of local hospital facilities, such that judicial
review of rejection of a membership application was proper and the grounds for exclusion
cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society, 34 N.J.
at 598, 170 A.2d at 800. See Pinsker II, 12 Cal. 3d at 551-5, 526 P 2d at 260-61, 116 Cal.
Rptr. at 253.
147. PinskerlIadopts the term "fair procedure" which is continued in subsequent cases.
The court is careful to point out that the basis of fair procedure is not constitutional. "It is
important to note that the legal duties imposed. . . arise from the common law rather than
from the Constitution as such; although Pinsker I utilized 'due process' terminology in
describing defendant associations' obligations, the 'due process' concept is applicable only in
its broadest, nonconstitutional connotation." Pinsker II, 12 Cal. 3d at 550 n.7, 526 P.2d 259
n.7, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 251 n.7. The court substitutes the words "fair procedure" for "minimal
due process" to avoid further confusion.
Of course the "essence of due process is fair procedure," as will be seen in Part IV infra.
148. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 649-50, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697-98.
149. Id at 650, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 698.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 7:217

therefore entitled to fair procedure.' 50
In Ascherman v. Saint FrancisMemorial Hospital'51 [hereinafter
cited as Ascherman 11], the Court of Appeal had the advantage of the
decisions of both Pinsker cases and Ascherman I to guide it in another
staff privileges case. In Ascherman II, a formally private hospital denied the same Dr. Ascherman appointment to the staff without the minimal common law standards of fair procedure.15 2 The court reaffimed
that it would not distinguish between a public and private hospital as to
53
procedural protections required in determining staff privileges cases. 1
The court also clarified what showing was necessary regarding the
power exercised by the association over the practice of the individual's
profession in order to require common law fair procedure. It held that
"economic necessity" was not the criterion, but rather whether "denial
of membership would effectively impair the applicant's right 'to fully
practice his profession' ,.51 The court restated its position that the
mere existence of other hospitals in the area may not prevent a deprivation of a substantial economic advantage and categorically concluded
"that denial of staff membership would effectively impair the physician's right to fully practice his profession."' 55 Therefore, the rule in
California is that whenever a hospital is making a determination as to
staff privileges it must utilize common law fair procedure protections.
In Ascherman I the court spoke of the policy behind abolishing the
public-private distinction as it related to hospitals in staff privileges
cases. Citing from the Hawaii Supreme Court case of Silver v. Castle
MemorialHospital5 6 the court stated: "if the proposition that any hospital occupies a fiduciary trust relationship between itself, its staff and
the public it seeks to serve is accepted, then the rationale for any distinction between public, 'quasi public' and truly private breaks down
and becomes meaningless, especially if the hospital's patients are considered to be of primary concern."'15 7 This statement affirms the soundness of the California approach to the public-private distinction. A
hospital's primary concern is patient care and the quality of that care is
based primarily on the capabilities of treating physicians. Whether a
hospital is public or private should not enter into the determination of
150. Id Note that Ascherman I was approved in Pinsker I.
151. 45 Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975).
152. Id at 514, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
153. Id at 512-13, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
154. Id at 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
155. Id
156. 53 Haw. 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert.denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972). A significant part of
the Aseherman I decision is taken from this Hawaii case which abolished the public-private
distinction as it relates to hospital staff privileges and applied a fair procedure right to both
situations.
157. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 645, 114 Cal. Rptr. 694-95. See Silver v. Castle
Mem. Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 482; 497 P.2d 564, 570 (1972).
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a physician's ability to practice in the hospital. According to the California courts there is no legitimate need for such a distinction.
5 8 a physician was
In Anton v. San Antonio Community Hospital,I

not reappointed to the staff of the hospital. He alleged a denial of fair
procedure in his hearing by the hospital's judicial review committee,
whose decision was sustained by the hospital board of directors. One
issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the trial court
could employ the broader review under the administrative mandate,
§ 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, 5 9 rather than

under the traditional mandate. 6 In holding that California Code of
Civil Procedure § 1094.5 was applicable, the Court noted that minimal
common law procedures are required for physician staff privileges determinations.' 6' The Anton decision reaffirms the requirement that fair
procedure must accompany a hospital staff privileges determinations
for both public and private hospitals, and it greatly expands the judicial

review of such determinations.
In Strumsky v. San Diego County Employee's Retirement Association, 162 the court stated that if the challenged decision "substantially
affects a fundamental vested right, the court,. . . must exercise its independent judgment on the evidence and find and abuse of discretion if
the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence."' 16 1 However, when no fundamental right is at stake, the scope of review is limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record." 6 This is the so called Bixby-

Strumsky rule. Thus the Anton court had the opportunity to deal with
the nature of a physician's rights to staff membership in determining
158. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
159. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 1974). This section is to be used in all cases
"Where the writ [of mandate] is issued for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any
final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a
hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or officer....
"[I1nquiry in such a case shall extend to questions. . . whether there was a fair trial; and
whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established if
the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is not
supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1094.5(a), (b) (West 1974). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(c) (West 1974)
allows the reviewing court to use its own independent judgment in review of certain situations.
160. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1974).
161. Anton v. San Antonio Com. Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 815; 567 P.2d 1162, 1168; 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 448 (1977).
162. 11 Cal. 3d 28, 520 P.2d 29, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1974).
163. Id at 44, 520 P.2d at 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
164. Id at 44-45, 520 P.2d at 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 816. See also Bixby v. Pierro, 4 Cal.
3d 130,481 P.2d 242, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1971). These two cases are collectively referred to as
the Bixby-Strumsky rule.
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the scope of judicial review under § 1094.5. The court found that the
right to staff privileges was "clearly fundamental," thus satisfying the
Bixby-Strumsky rule and allowing the broader scope of judicial review. 165 The court rejected the defendant hospital's contention that the
right is not vested since appointment is made either on an annual or
biennial basis 16 6 and that reappointment is therefore subject to review
by the hospital.1 67 This is in essence the BoardofRegents v. Roth argument and was vociferously rejected by the Anton Court:
[t]his contention, we believe, wholly ignores the realities of the
situation confronting us . . . the admission of a physician to
medical. . . staff membership establishes a relationship between
physician and hospital which, although formally limited in duration by force of law, gives rise to rights and obligations. . . . The
previously admitted physician. . . may not be denied reappointment to the medical staff absent a hearing and other procedural
prerequisites consistent with minimal due process protections...
a hospital board, through its act of initially admitting a physician
to medical staff membership, has thereby, in the exercise of its
discretion, necessarily determined his fitness for such membership at the time of admission andgrantedhim full rights of membershop. The fact that review of this appointment is made
mandatory on an annual or biennial basis. . . can by no means
be said to render it probationary or tentative in effect. . . . In
short, the full rights of staff membership vest upon appointment,
subject to divestment upon periodic review only after a showing
of adequate cause for such divestment in a proceeding consistent
with minimal due process requirements.'
California rejects the approach of United States Supreme Court
decisions which hold that there is no vested right to reappointment,
treating appointment as membership in an association. Once admitted,
the individual cannot be ousted without the protection of a fair procedure even though membership may be subject to periodic review.
The Anton court points out that in reality, review procedures are
quite similar for both public and private hospitals due to pressures to
165. Anton v. San Antonio Com. Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 823, 567 P.2d at 1174, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 454. The rule of Anton was changed by the legislature in 1978 in California Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5(d).
166. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2392.5 (West 1974).
167. In a footnote the court here makes it clear that the same procedural protections are
applied to the physician seeking appointment or reappointment. But when determining
whether there is a vested interest for purposes of 1094.5 review, appointment and reappointment review is not the same, as the interest of the physician in initial appointment to staff
privileges is clearly not vested. Anton v. San Antonio Com. Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 824, n.22,
567 P.2d at 1174, n.22, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 454, n.22.
168. Id at 824-25, 567 P.2d at 1174-76, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 454-55 [emphasis in original,
footnotes and citations omitted]. Cf. Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56, 61
(8th Cir. 1975); Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir' 1971).
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conform to standards set by national and state accrediting organizations which are prerequisites for hospital accreditation. 16 9 The court
concluded that the use of the "same judicial procedure for reviewing
the adjudicatory decisions of all such hospitals is peculiarly appropriate."' 17 This observation is crucial. "[I]t is clear. . . that the practical
necessity of securing JCAH [Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals] accreditation has the effect of insuring that substantially all
hospitals in this state, whether public or private, have bylaws governing
hearing and appellate procedures which are designed to comply with
JCAH standards and which, in most cases, are based either on the 1971
JCAH Guidelines or the more recent CMA-CHA [California Medical
Association-California Hospital Association] Uniform Code of Hearing and Appeal Procedures."'' The same trend will be true in hospitals throughout the country which seek JCAH accreditation. 172 Since
the accrediting organizations require procedural protections of the physician's staff privileges, as the hospitals adopt these standards litigation
involving staff privileges should decrease significantly. The only controversies remaining will be whether the procedures set forth by the
accrediting organizations and adopted by the hospitals are constitutionally sufficient (or fair procedurally) and suits determining whether the
hospital has followed the procedures set forth in its bylaws.
In conclusion, the California courts have been the most enlightened in the country in arriving at protections for the physician's staff
privileges.' 7 3 The California approach offers a viable solution to the
169. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals is a national body responsible
for accreditation of hospitals. JCAH sets forth accreditation standards and guidelines, including guidelines as to medical staff appointment, reappointment and disciplinary actions
requiring hearing and appeal procedures. JCAH, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPiTALS (1976); JCAH, GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS,
RULES AND REGULATIONS (1971).

The California Medical Association and California Hospital Association also have accreditation functions and publish similar guidelines with similar protection. CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL RELATIONSHIPS (1974) which includes the
UNIFORM CODE OF HEARING AND APPEAL PROCEDURES (1971).

170. 19 Cal. 3d at 820, 567 P.2d at 1172, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 452 (footnote omitted).
171. Id at 820, 567 P.2d at 1171, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 451. California in fact requires its
public hospitals to provide for appointment and reappointment of the medical staff as provided by the JCAH standards. Local Hospital District Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 2128 (West 1973).
172. The importance of accreditation will be discussed in greater detail in Part V, infra.
173. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977) dealt with
the common law fair procedure principal. The case involved a surgical resident dismissed
from the hospital without notice of charges and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme
Court of California reaffirmed the Finsker, Ascherman and Anton principles, and further
decreased the power necessary to be exercised by the private entity before fair procedure is
required. Invoking fair procedure "does not depend on the existence of 'monopoly' power"
but rather whether "the practical power of the entity" is such as "to affect substantially an
important economic interest." Id at 277, 572 P.2d at 38-39, 142 Cal. Rptr. 424-25.
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74
difficulties in invoking Fourteenth Amendment due process. 1

IV.

The Process Which is Due

In evaluating an individual's constitutional claim" under the due
process clause, the courts often employ a two-step analysis.' 75 The first
step involves the threshold issues: is there state action' 7 6 and has a liberty or property interest' 77 been denied. If these requirements are satis-

fied, the- second step is to determine what procedural protections are
required under the due process clause. This section will deal with the
process which is due the physician in protecting his staff privileges
under both the constitutional due process and the common law fair

procedure approaches. Following with this discussion, selected hospital bylaws and model bylaws of accrediting organizations will be ana-

lyzed as to the sufficiency of the protections they afford.
A.

Federal Due Process
There are no specifically defined procedural requirements for a

proceeding governed by the due process clause. Rather, the procedural
protections required of a particular proceeding depend upon a complex
of factors. ' 78 Although the Supreme Court did find it necessary to spell
out some specific requirements as essential to procedural protection in
its 1970 decision, Goldberg v. Kelley, 179 subsequent Supreme Court de-

cisions show that the usual view of the Court is that the particular institutional and factual context will be considered in deciding what specific
procedural protections are required under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 80
This course is shown in the recent Supreme Court case of Mathews
174. Cases in other states to adopt similar doctrines are: Blender v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 96 Ariz. 240, 393 P.2d 926 (1964); Silver v. Castle Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii
475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972); Bricker v. Sceva Speare Mem. Hosp., 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589
(1971); Sussman v. Overlook Hosp. Ass'n, 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp. Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 250 N.E. 2d 892 (1969); Woodward v.
Porter Hosp., 125 Vt. 419, 217 A.2d 37 (1966).
175. See Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1976). Cf.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
176. See Part I, supra.
177. See Part II, supra.
178. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
179. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the Court held that a pre-termination hearing was required before welfare payments could be rescinded. The Court stated the specific requirements to be: a hearing "at a meaningful time and in a meaninqful manner", opportunity of
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, a right to an attorney if desired, and a
decision based on the legal rules and evidence offered at trial, by an impartial decision
maker with reasons stated for the decision. Id at 267-71.
180. Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1211, (W.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd,
499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974) referring to the United States Supreme Court decisions of
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v. Eldridge,18 1 wherein the Court states the current test used to establish
the specific due process requirements. Three factors must be considered:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
additional or substitute
fiscal and administrative burdens that the
82
procedural requirement would entail.'
The constitutional necessity of a specific procedure is determined by
weighing these three factors.
In modem society much of the practice of medicine is performed
in the hospital, and for practitioners of certain specialties, medical technology has developed to the point where procedures and equipment
can only be supplied by a hospital.'8 3 In assessing the severity of a
hospital's denial of staff privileges to a physician, as the first Mathews
factor, it is necessary to consider the physician's access to other hospitals. If there are few alternatives in the locality of the physician's practice, exclusion from a hospital's staff may preclude the physician from
practicing medicine altogether or at least cause him to lose significant
income where his practice is limited to care that can be rendered
outside the hospital.' 8 4 Another element in determining the physician's
interest under the Mathews v. Eldridge formula is whether the charge or
action taken against the physician will damage his reputation and professional standing. Such damage can lead to loss of referrals, loss of
other staff privileges and can affect malpractice insurance coverage. If
such a charge or action will seriously affect one of these elements of the
practice, then significant procedural protections may be rephysician's
85
quired.1
The second Mathews factor has been explained by one court as
whether "the risk of an erroneous decision prejudicial to the plaintiff
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) and Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) as
examples.
181. 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
182. id at 335.
183. The interest of the physician in hospital staff privileges is parallel to his liberty and
property interest in hospital privileges and practicing his profession. For more complete
discussion of these interests see Part II, infra.
184. Meredith v. Allen County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 36 .(6th Cir.
1968).
185. See generally Strettan v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 368 (9th Cir.
1976); Meredith v. Allen County War Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33, 36 (6th Cir. 1968).
Required procedural protectors will depend on the action taken by the hospital. Where
privileges are merely restricted, but not denied, the physician's interest in staff privileges is
less affected. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F Supp. 301, 309 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
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under the procedures employed" is greater than "the probable reduction of error which might result from a more elaborate or differently
timed set of procedures."' 6 In Strettan v. Wadsworth Veterans Hospital,'8 7 the Ninth Circuit grappled with a situation involving a hospital
resident who was allegedly terminated without due process protections.
The court reviewed the challenged procedure in light of the second Mathews factor and determined that a full adversary hearing was unlikely

to be more useful than less elaborate procedures in preventing injustice

against the terminated resident.' 8 Under this approach the appellate

court inspects the facts revealed by the record of the lower court and
compares these to the facts revealed by the challenged proceeding. It

then decides whether a procedure with greater protections would have
better preserved the physician's privileges. The appellate court can

thus decide that even if the physician had been afforded all the formal
procedural protections, his staff privileges should still have been suspended. In such a case, the challenged hearing may be held sufficient
despite procedural deficiencies.

In weighing the third Mathews factor, the hospital, which stands in
the shoes of the state, "has an overwhelming interest in maintaining the
highest standards of medical care for its patients. ." ' and obviously

seeks to achieve the greatest quality of medical care possible. This is
true from the standpoints of both patient care and the practicalities of
insurance coverage and liability for negligent care rendered by staff
physicians. 9 ' It is unclear whether procedural protections of staff priv-

ileges will interfere with the hospital's ability to provide excellent care
to the patient, 191 but it must be assumed that procedural protections do

not hide the true facts of a physician's negligence or incompetence.
Rather they protect the physician from a decision rendered on rumor
or personal prejudice of the other physicians sitting in judgment. The
only justification for not providing such protection is the administrative
186. Strettan v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 369 (9th Cir. 1976).
187. Id Note that while Veterans Administration hospitals are specifically governed by
statute to provide a full adversary hearing to physicians (38 U.S.C. § 4110 1976), this case
involved a medical resident and thus involves the usual constitutional analysis in determining procedural protections due under the due process clause. Although medical residents
are not the subject of this note, the constitutional issue as to the second factor of the Mathews test is relevant to this note.
188. Id at 368-69.
189. Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301. 309 (E.D. Penn. 1970).
190. Id
191. "The survival of patients often depends upon the presence of competent physicians.
The interest of the hospital in enlarging the prospects of survival of patients weighs in favor
of due process procedures which will minimize the risk of the continued employment of an
incompetent doctor, so long as these procedures are consistent with the notions of fundamental fairness." Strettan v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361, 368 (9th Cir. 1976)
(footnote omitted).
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cost or burden involved, which consists primarily of the cost of the physicians' time who must judge the case in the more lengthy adversary
hearing. It is unlikely that this burden could ever justify the significant
deprivation of rights that might occur as a result of a proceeding without sufficient procedural protections.
B. The Common Law Approach
California has recognized a similar balancing of interests in order
to support the application of common law fair procedures to hospital
staff privileges cases. Under the common law approach it is the power
that the association is able to exert over the economic necessities of the
individual applicant that mandates minimal procedural protections accompanying the association's decisions. In Wyatt, the first case in California to deal with staff privileges, the court acknowledged that a
disallowance of staff privileges means, realistically, a denial of the right
to practice.192 The hospital board making staff privileges decisions performs, the court held, a quasi-judicial function and it must afford certain procedural protections to the staff applicant. 93 In Wyatt the

procedural protection required was a simple hearing for the physicians.
In Ascherman I the court of appeal held that the interests of the

doctor, hospital and public must all be considered in hospital privilege
proceedings

94

and quoted from the Silver v. Castle decision which set

192. Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. Dist., 174 Cal. App. 709, 715; 345 P.2d 93, 97 (1959).
"In this day of advanced medical knowledge and advanced diagnostic techniques much of
what a physician or surgeon must do can only be performed in a hospital. In many instances
only a hospital has the facilities necessary for proper diagnosis or treatment." Id at 715, 345
P.2d at 97.
193. Id at 716, 345 P.2d at 97. See also Rosner v. Eden Township Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal.
2d 592, 598, 375 P.2d 431, 25 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1962).
194. Ascherman 1, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 647-49, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97; text accompanying notes 155-57, supra. See also Ascherman II, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
509, where the court said, "We conclude, therefore, that denial of staff membership would
effectively impair the physician's right to fully practice his profession" and so required the
hospital to use fair procedure in dealing with staff privileges applications. In Ezekial v.
Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977) the court reiterated the
Wyatt statement as to the interest of a physician in practicing in a hospital and made clear
that although Wyatt involved a public hospital, the common law of fair procedure as to this
interest of practicing in a hospital has been extended to public hospitals. Also, it appears
from Ezekial that California goes far in recognizing the interests of the physician in staff
privileges. The court spoke of its sensitivity to the "difficulty and danger, on the one hand,
of any undue restrictions on the essential ability of a hospital to discipline its professional
staff thereby controlling its professional performances, while, on the other hand, malpractice
liability is imposed on the hospital for its failure to exercise such control." But the court
concluded: "[w]e emphasize, however . . . [that hospitals] are not precluded from dismissing. . . for incompetence. We hold only that, in doing so, they must afford. . . rudimentary procedural and substantive fairness." Id at 278, 572 P.2d at 39, 142 Cal. Rtpr. at
425.
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forth specific procedural requirements. 95 However, subsequently in
Pinsker II, the California Supreme Court set forth only the basic procedural standards to be followed, holding that "the associations themselves should retain the initial and primary responsibility for devising a
method which provides an applicant adequate notice of the 'charges'
against him and a reasonable opportunity to respond."'' 96 The court
was careful to point out that the common law fair procedure requirement does not mandate "formal proceedings with all the embellishments of a court trial" or adherence to "a single mode of process."
Rather, a variety of procedures will satisfy the requirement as long as
they provide the opportunity for the individual applicant to present his
position. 19 Thus the key elements of a "fair procedure" are notice to
an applicant of the reason for the proposed rejection with reasonable
opportunity to defend himself.19 8
In effect, California fair procedure and federal constitutional due
process are really not all that different. This is not surprising since the
United States Supreme Court has stated that the essence of due process
is fair procedure." 9 Accordingly, fair procedure and due process will
be referred to together henceforth, except where they may specifically
differ and such instances will be made clear in the text.
195. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 648-49, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697; Silver v. Castle Mem.
Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 484-85, 497 P.2d 564, 571-72 (1972). The protections included a hearing, notice to adequately prepare a defense, a written statement of specific charges or reasons
for the application being denied, a right to call witnesses, a discretionary right to counsel, a
basis for decision of substantive evidence produced at the hearing and a written decision
including the basis of decision so there is an adequate record for judicial review.
196. Pinsker II, 12 Cal. 3d at 555-56, 526 P.2d at 263-64, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56. The
court decided that the procedure followed by the hospital did not meet the minimum standards required under the common law since the applicant was not given an opportunity to
respond to the charges raised against him.
197. Id at 555, 526 P.2d at 265, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 255. The court's guide to the drafters of
such procedures is that "the organization should consider the nature of the tendered issue
and should fashion its procedure to insure afair opportunity for an applicant to present his
position." Id at 555-56, 526 P.2d at 263-64, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 255-56 [emphasis in original].
The court noted that the association retained discretion, but that the courts remain available
for abuse of that discretion. Id
198. Id at 555, 526 P.2d 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255. This concept seemed to be applied at
its minimum in Anton where the court said that the proceedings were fair procedure as
required under the common law since the procedure in question provided "adequate notice
of charges and a 'fair opportunity [for the affected party] to present his position.' Our Pinsker decision requires no more than this." 19 Cal. 3d at 830, 567 P.2d at 1178, 140 Cal. Rptr.
at 458. The Pinsker II statements were reaffirmed in Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d at 279,
142 Cal. Rptr. at 425-26.
199. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See also Poe v. Charlotte Mem. Hosp.,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1304 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
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Hospital Bylaws in Regard to Specific Procedural
Protections

The internal rules of a hospital take the form of bylaws, rules generally adopted by the governing body of the hospital to control its operation. Specific bylaws are adopted either voluntarily or by statutory
requirement.2 0 0 Bylaws are important to the physician because they
detail the various procedures the hospital has adopted and chosen to
follow when dealing with appointment, reappointment and revocation
of staff privileges. If the hospital fails to follow its adopted bylaw procedures, it decisions are subject to judicial review.201
In an effort to assist hospitals in complying with accreditation
standards, accrediting organizations have developed manuals, guidelines and model bylaws for hospitals to follow when writing or revising
their bylaws.20 2 As the California Supreme Court noted in Anton, the
pressures of accreditation have resulted in hospitals largely adopting
the guidelines set forth by the accrediting organizations with the resulting effect of standardizing hospital procedures. The purpose of accreditation20 3 is to develop national (or statewide) standards of structure,
function, staffing and procedure for hospitals, all directed toward the
200. For example, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2392.5 (West 1974) requires private corporate hospitals to provide for bylaws to organize the medical staff.
201. This is the exception to the general rule that a private hospital has a right to exclude
a physician for whatever reason, the decision of the hospital authorities not being subject to
judicial review. In the event of "a case in which there is a failure to conform to procedural
requirements set forth in its [the hospital's] constitution by-laws, or rules and regulations,"
the "extent ofjudicial review is to require compliance with the prescribed procedure." Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 63, aj9d, 348 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
See also Berberian v. Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 395 Pa. 257, 263, 149 A.2d 456,
459 (1959), where the court said that the hospital had voluntarily restricted its freedom of
discretion by its bylaws. The bylaws functioned as a contractual obligation which must be
followed when removing a physician. See also Note, The Physician'sRight to HospitalStaff
Membersho: The Public-PrivateDichotomy, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 494.
202. The JCAH has an ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ACCREDITATION MANUAL] which sets forth standards for the operation of the hospital with accompanying interpretations to serve as a guide for those implementing them; and
GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS (1971) [hereinafter cited as JCAH, Guidelines] which set forth actual acceptable bylaws and comments thereto. The California Medical Association publishes a GUIDING
PRINCIPLES FOR PHYSICIAN-HoSPITAL RELATIONSHIPS (1974) [hereinafter cited as CMA,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES] which are guidelines for formulating medical staff bylaws, including
the CMA-CHA UNIFORM CODE OF HEARING AND APPEAL PROCEDURES (1974) [hereinafter
cited as UNIFORM CODE]. The CMA has also published MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS

(1965).
203. National accreditation of hospitals is by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (consisting of the American College of Surgeons, the American College of Physicians, the American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association). State
medical associations often accreditate hospitals, as do the California Medical Association
and the California Hospital Association.
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"provision and maintenance of the optimal quality of patient care" in
the hospital. 2" Although accreditation is ostensibly voluntary, it is a
practical necessity and is actively sought.2" 5 The remainder of this note
will examine specific procedural protections in relation to the JCAH
and CMA standards to determine if hospitals are adequately protecting
the physician's right to staff privileges. It is especially important to analyze the protection afforded by the standards of these two accrediting
organizations 20 6 since it is these standards which are uniformly followed in hospitals throughout California and across the nation.
A. Right to Counsel
Neither the JCAH Guidelines nor the CMA GuidingPrincolesprovide for a right to legal representation at the staff privileges hearing.20 7
204. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 202, at "forward," and "introduction-purpose."
205. For example, the Medicare Act refers to the standards of the JCAH in its conditions
for hospital participation in the program and hospitals accredited by the JCAH are automatically deemed to be in compliance with the conditions of participation and eligible to participate in the Medicare program and receive Medicare funds. See ACCREDITATION MANUAL,
supra note 202, at 8. See also Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 81820, 567 P.2d 1171-72, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52.
206. It is quite evident that the JCAH and the CMA have reacted to the extensive litigation in this area by raising and promoting their standards as to review of physician's privileges to include due process procedural protections. Section 6.8 of the PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS in the OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE AMA
(1977) [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS AND REPORTS] states that the "basic principles of a fair
and objective hearing should always be accorded to the physician whose professional conduct is being reviewed." OPINIONS AND REPORTS at 37. It states the fundamental aspects of
a fair hearing to be: listing of specific charges, notice, right to a hearing, right to be present,
to rebut evidence and to present a defense. The principle further speaks to physicians who
judge others by saying "[a]ll physicians are urged to observe diligently these fundamental
safeguards of due process whenever they are called upon to serve on a committee which will
pass judgment on physicians." Finally: "[m]edical societies and hospital medical staffs are
urged to review the constitution and bylaws of the society or hospital medical staff to make
sure that these instruments provide for such procedural safeguards." OPINIONS AND REPORTS at 37.
In California the CMA, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS (1965) dealt extensively with
the requirement for hearing due to the great concern generated by the courts and the legislature. The document was designed to assure "due process," explaining that these concepts
will be new to many medical staffs.
In 1974 the UNIFORM CODE OF HEARING AND APPEAL PROCEDURES was written because "the courts of this state have rendered significant decisions in the area of the right of a
practitioner to due process when his medical staff privileges are under review. These decisions have created a need for more formal, detailed procedures in the area of the physician's
right to a hearing and appeal." CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, at 6.
207. JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, art. VIII (Hearing and Appellate Review), § 5j:
"neither the affected practitioner, nor the executive committee of the medical staff or the
governing body, shall be represented at any phase of the hearing procedure by an attorney at
law unless the hearing committee, in its discretion, permits both sides to be represented by
counsel." However, the "affected practitioner shall be entitled to be accompanied by and/or
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The omission of counsel serves the purpose of peer review: "[t]he hearing provided for in these bylaws [is] for the purpose of resolving, on an
intra-professional basis, matters bearing on professional competency
and conduct."2 °8 This is consistent with the medical tradition of peer
review acknowledged in the introduction to the CMA's Guiding Principles: "[tihe self-disciplinary features are stressed because no one is bet20 9
ter qualified to judge the quality of medical care than a physician."
Under the Mathews formulation, the hospital's interest in maintaining peer review is balanced against the physician's interest in maintaining staff privileges and the risk that denying a right to counsel will
result in an erroneous deprivation of the physician's interest.2 1 0 The
physician's interest in staff privileges, especially in reappointment and
revocation proceedings, is extremely important. It is apparent that the
presence of an attorney would play a significant part in preserving the
rights and interest of the physician in the staff privileges proceeding.
The individual physician may not adequately defend himself in a complex proceeding or insist that the bylaw procedures be strictly followed.
Quite often the accused practitioner, having his privileges reviewed for"
the first time, will be unfamiliar with the mode of proceeding and be at
a distinct disadvantage. The question becomes whether medical professionals should be allowed to restrict an important right of another
professional, the interest in staff privileges, without being required to
observe certain procedural protections, such as assistance of counsel.
Do the benefits of counsel outweigh any increase in the formality of the
staff privilege hearing? Certainly this question should be resolved in
favor of the physician. After all, peer review is not dispensed with
when the accused physician is allowed to have counsel represent him; it
is simply more formalized.
Although the CMA and JCAH model bylaws do not afford counsel as a matter of right, they do provide that it is within the hospital's
discretion to specify when the physician will be allowed counsel.2 1 In
California, the CMA and JCAH guidelines on the question of discrerepresented at the hearing by a member . . . of his local professional society." JCAH,
GUIDELINES, supranote 202, art. VIII, §5e. This does not preclude any of the parties from
seeking counsel for assistance in preparing for the hearing or appeal. JCAH, GUIDELINES,
supra note 202, art. VIII, § 5j. UNIFORM CODE, supra note 202, § 3b is substantially the
same.
208. JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, art. VIII, § 5j. A substantially identical statement is in CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, UNIFORM CODE, supra note 202, § 3b.
209. CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, at I. See also OPINIONS AND REPORTS, supra note 206, § 6.61 (1976): "forms of peer review have been long established by
organized medicine to scrutinize physicians' professional conduct. . . .They are. . . recognized and accepted. They are necessary."
210. See notes 181-91 and accompanying text, supra.
211. ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 202, art. VIII, § I(j); CMA, MODEL MEDICAL
STAFF BYLAWS.
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tionary allowance of presence of counsel, have been specifically approved by the Anton court as meeting the minimal due process
standards. a l This protection, however, is offset by the JCAH and
CMA provision for appointment of a hearing officer, who can be an
attorney and who has the responsibility to advise the review committee.213 By permitting the committee to consult an attorney, the model
bylaws work an unfair disadvantage to the accused physician who is
denied the right of legal representation. This is especially the case in
the CMA, Guiding Principles which allow the legal counsel of the hospital to be the hearing officer. The hospital's legal counsel traditionally
represents the hospital administration in legal matters. He might very
well bring a conflict of interest, if not an unfair prejudice, to the accused physician's hearing.
In summary, the hospital's interest in maintaining peer review and
discouraging legal formalism is not sufficient to deprive the physician
of his right to counsel at a staff privileges hearing. Although the Anton
court has approved the discretionary allowance of counsel at such proceedings, due to the important interest of the physician in maintaining
his staff privileges, an abuse of discretion in failing to allow the physician counsel at the hearing should be readily found in all but the more
simple cases. An abuse of discretion should be automatically found
where the physician was denied counsel but there was a hearing officer
who was an attorney since such a denial is patently unfair. The bylaws
should provide that when a hearing officer is requested who is an attorney, the right to counsel is removed from the discretion of the hearing
committee and the accused physician is automatically entitled to counsel.
212. "[W]e find that the rule here in question-rendering representation by counsel a
matter within the discretion of the judicial review committee-is not offensive to the standard of 'minimal due process' which is applicable in proceedings of this kind." Anton v. San
Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 827, 567 P.2d at 1177, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 457. The
A.scherman I decision also placed the right to counsel within the discretion of the hospital
board. Ascherman I, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 648, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (citing Sivler v. Castle
Mem. Hosp., 53 Hawaii at 484-85, 497 P.2d at 571-72).
213. CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, § 3(d): "At the request of the person
who requested the hearing, the executive committee, the judicial review committee or on its
own request, the governing body may appoint a hearing officer who may be an attorney at
law to preside at the hearing. Such hearing officer may be legal counsel to the hospital,
provided he acts during the hearing in accord with this Code. He must not act as a prosecuting officer, as an advocate for the hospital, governing body or executive committee, or body
whose action prompted the hearing. If requested by the judicial review committee, he may
participate in the deliberation of such body and be a legal advisor to it, but he shall not be
entitled to vote." JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, art. VIII, § 5j, also says that a hearing
officer may be utilized and may be an attorney at law and, in the comment following, that he
can participate in the deliberations and act as an advisor, though he may not vote.
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Impartiality

Due process requires a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal.2 14
A fair hearing is often impossible where those who sit-in judgment are
either biased as to the outcome, or have participated in other stages of
the proceeding such as prosecution or investigation." 5 One problem
that exists in medical staff cases is that the physicians who judge the
allegedly delinquent physician are usually his staff colleagues and have
heard about the physician's problems before proceedings have been initiated. The strong danger of forming a prejudgment or being biased as
to the outcome of the decision involving the physician's staff privileges
is obvious. Notwithstanding this risk of prejudice, the Eight Circuit, in
.Klinge v. Lutheran CharitiesAssociation of St. Louis,2 16 has stated that
although the physician is entitled to have his case judged by fairminded doctors using good faith objectivity, the physician "was not entitled to a panel made up of outsiders or of doctors who have never
heard of the case and who know nothing about the facts of it or what
they supposed the facts to be."2' 17 The court recognized that it was
probable that the affected physician's problems had come to the attention of those who practiced with him at the hospital, but that "[i]t does
not follow, however, that the members of the panel were disqualified
from sitting or that they were unable to and did not give the case fair
and impartial consideration in the context in which it was presented to
them. A panel of doctors does not ordinarily vote to expel a colleague
from a hospital staff for trivial causes or where lesser sanctions or restrictions would serve the purpose. 2 18 The court assumes a good faith
decision by doctors absent a specific showing of bias. Under the Mathews factors this seems a reasonable approach. It would be virtually
impossible for the hospital to place doctors on the hearing committee
who know nothing of the case; and the burden on the hospital to provide such a panel would be tremendous. Absent a showing of bias, the
hospital's interest in not having to search for doctors unfamiliar with
the case clearly outweighs the accused physician's interest in a completely impartial tribunal.
Another aspect of the problem of impartiality involves the validity
of permitting the same body or agency to perform both investigative
and adjudicative functions. The Supreme Court, in Withow v.
Larkin,2 19 has said that it is not necessarily a violation of due process
214. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (per curiam). See also Duffield v.
Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974).
215. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.01 (1958). See generally id

ch. 12,
216.
217.
218.
219.

13.
523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id at 63.
Id
421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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for the same agency to perform both functions. Moreover, administrative fact finders are not necessarily disqualified from participating in an
adversary hearing. If there is no showing to the contrary, then men are
assumed to be of conscience and intellectual discipline, and capable of
fairness.2 ° In Suckle v. Madison General Hospital22' the court held
that the presence of 21 members of the investigating committee among
the 144 member medical staff, which was to decide whether to reappoint an accused physician, would not "render the proceedings unconstitutional" as it was not conclusive that a measure of deference would
be given to their opinions merely because they had participated in investigative activity. 222 The court left open the question of whether such
persons were constitutionally permitted to vote.2 23
In Duffleld v. CharlestonArea Medical Center, Inc.224 impartiality
was challenged where members of the governing board who accepted
and adopted the surgery department's recommendation that the physician's hospital privileges be withdrawn also sat on the Joint Conference
Committee, which made final disposition of the case. The court held
that the governing board members were not disqualified to sit and vote
as members of the Joint Conference Committee since the action upon
which the affected physician based his claim of bias "had no 'extrajudicial source' but represented simply a step, largely a procedural one at
that, in the administrative resolution of the proceedings involving...
[the physician]. . . . [t]he decision taken was purely tentative and con26
ditional ....
1221 Similarly, in Woodbury v. McKinnon,
"[t]he consideration on a previous occasion of the. . . [physician's] qualifications
would not demonstrate such bias as to constitute a denial of due proc227
ess."
The JCAH and CMA provisions go far beyond judicial decisions
in protecting the physician from partiality. The JCAH Guidelines provide that "[n]o staff member who has actively participated in the consideration of the adverse recommendation shall be appointed a
member of this hearing committee unless it is otherwise impossible to
' 228
select a representative group due to the size of the medical staff.
CMA's Guiding Principles provides that the review committee shall be
composed of medical staff members "who shall not have actively par220. Id at 55. See also Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Ass'n of St. Louis, 523 F.2d 56, 63
(8th Cir. 1975).
221. 362 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Wis. 1973), afe'd, 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974).
222. Id at 1219.
223. Id
224. 503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974).
225. Id at 518-19.
226. 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971).
227. Id at 845.
228. JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, art. VIII, § 4a.
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ticipated in the consideration of the matter involved at any previous
level."2' 29 But the provision continues to recognize the existence of the
problem in the Klinge case: "Knowledge of the matter involved shall
not preclude a member of the active medical staff from serving as a
member of the judicial review committee. ' '230 Thus, JCAH and CMA
provisions adequately protect the physician in a staff privileges proceeding from the danger of partiality.
C. Notice
Due process requires an individual to receive sufficient notice of
charges made against him so that he can adequately prepare a defense
to the charges. Abuses can occur both where the notice is not given far
enough in advance to allow preparation of a defense and where the
notice is so substantively incomplete that it inadequately informs the
individual of the charges against him. The first situation, was addressed in Suckle v. Madison General Hospital2 3 ' where a physician
seeking reappointment was given only a few minutes notice of his opportunity to meet with the committee which ultimately recommended
his nonreappointment. The court found that this was insufficient notice
as it did not give him "a minimally adequate opportunity to respond. 2 3 2
A common problem in physician staff privileges cases is the second
situation mentioned above. Where the basis for denial of privileges is
inadequate patient care, there is a dilemma as to the specificity required in the notice. For example, must the hospital specify every act
of the physician which it finds objectionable, or only aver to general
situations? In Woodbury v. McKinnon23 3 the physician was furnished
with the names of specific cases in connection with a charge of lack of
competence and judgment to perform surgery, but he was not given the
exact nature of the fault in each case as requested. The Fifth Circuit
held that the physician, "as a professional person, was sufficiently notified of the basis upon which the medical staff was considering his competence for surgical privileges. ' 234 However, in Suckle the court found
that a physician received insufficient notice despite being furnished
with a list of ninety-six cases in connection with proceedings for his
reappointment, which was ultimately denied. The court found the notice to be constitutionally inadequate because the cases to be actually
discussed were not specified and the physician was denied access to
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

CMA, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, § 2e.
Id
362 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
Id at 1213.
447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id at 844.
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copies of the hospital records of the cases. The court stated that such
action "was neither to give him an adequate statement of the grounds
upon which any possible sanction was being considered, nor to give
him a minimally adequate opportunity to respond to any grounds
23 5
which. . . [he] might have guessed to be under consideration.
The JCAH and CMA bylaws effectively provide for notice in this
situation. The CMA principle states that as part of the notice of a hearing, the hospital must provide "in concise language, the acts or omissions with which the medical staff member is charged, [and] a list of
charts under question, by chart number .
*"236
notice
would likely not be
An example of a hospital bylaw where
sufficient is bylaw 6.2(A)(5) of the Medical Staff Bylaws of Stanford
University Hospital. It provides that notice shall consist of "the investigative body's recommendation and the grounds therefor."2'37 Under
such a bylaw grounds could simply be "incompetence" and it would be
almost impossible for the physician to adequately defend himself.
More specificity, such as to charts and cases, is required and the model
guidelines and bylaws so provide.
D.

Summary action

Hospitals contend that there are certain times that the hospital
must be able to immediately revoke a physician's staff privileges without benefit of a hearing. This would occur in the extreme situation
where the hospital felt that the physician might do immediate harm to
the patient unless suspended from the staff and barred from practice at
the hospital. This is an ideal situation for invoking the Mathews balancing test. In Citta v. Delaware Valley Hospital2 38 the court recognized the interest of the physician in staff privileges and the life and
death interest of the patient. The court struck the balance in favor of
summary action with the proviso that "the affected physician is given
an adjudicatory hearing within a reasonable time after his privileges
are restricted."23' 9 The interest of the hospital in preserving the life of
the patient where there is an immediate threat of harm due to the alleged incompetence of the physician certainly outweighs his interest in
a prior hearing. This is a proper balance, especially when one consid235. Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 362 F. Supp. at 1212.

236. CMA, GUIDING

PRINCIPLES, supra note

202, at 10. The JCAH model bylaw states

that "[t]he notice of hearing shall state in concise language the acts or omissions with which
the practitioner is charged, a list of specific or representative charts being questioned, and/or
the other reasons or subject matter that was considered in making the adverse recommendation or decision." JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 23, art. VII, § 3b.
237. MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS-STANFORD UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 9, art. 6.2, § A-5
[hereinafter cited as STANFORD BYLAWS].
238. 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
239. Id at 310 (footnote omitted).
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ers that the physician will receive a hearing soon after his privileges are
suspended.
The JCAH has integrated this balancing process into its applicable
bylaws. 24 0 The bylaws provide that a physician can be summarily suspended "whenever action must be taken immediately in the best interest of patient care in the hospital." 241 Thus,. before the physician can
immediately lose his staff privileges by summary suspension the hospital must have balanced the interests and determined that the welfare of
his patient(s) is clearly in danger. The bylaws further provide that after
his privileges have been suspended, the physician is "entitled to request
that a. . . hearing [be held] on the matter within. . . [a] reasonable
A hearing, though after suspension, is guarantime period. ... .
teed.24 3
E. Considerations in determining staff membership
Qualifications of the physician to be considered in determining
staff membership must be related to the purpose of providing adequate
medical care. In Schlein v. MilfordHospital,z4 the court stated the rule
that though "hospitals must have considerable discretion to determine
the necessary qualifications of doctors applying for staff privileges, they
must be careful to consider applicants only on grounds that are reasonably related to the purpose of providing adequate medical care. '245 In
Schlein the court found it reasonable for the committee to base its decision to reject the physician's application for staff privileges on his inability to get along with others. The court reasoned that "it is entirely
consistent with due process for a hospital, in deciding whether to grant
staff privileges, to evaluate those personal qualities of a physician that
reasonably relate to his ability to function effectively within a hospital
environment. A doctor's ability to work well with others, for instance,
is a factor that could significantly influence the standard of care his
patients received. Due process does not limit the hospital's considera240. JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, at 20, art. VIII, § 2(a)-2(d).
241. Id art. VIII, § 2(a).
242. Id art. VIII, § 2(b).
243. The CMA bylaw explains this balancing process best: "In grave and unusual cases
where the governing board, the executive committee of the medical staff or the chief of the
applicable section, determines that immediate action must be taken to protect the patient's
life or welfare, the chief of staff, department head, cognizant staff committee, or governing
board, may summarily suspend a member of the medical staff. In such cases, the aggrieved
party may request an immediate hearing before the executive committee to determine
whether such suspension shall be continued pending a hearing before the appropriate committee." CMA, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS 11.
244. 423 F. Supp. 541 (D. Conn. 1976).
245. Id at 544. See Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173,
176-77 (5th Cir. 1971).
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tion to technical medical skills. 24 6
Words that recur in the bylaws as qualifications for staff membership are "character," "ethics," "standing" and "competence." 247 These
are very evasive terms and they are not accompanied by standards to
guide those who determine staff privileges. Despite the apparent ambiguity of these terms, courts have upheld their validity as reasonably
related to the operation of the hospital.24 8 In Sosa v. Board ofManagers of Val Verde Memorial Hospital, the Fifth Circuit explained:
"[a]dmittedly, standards such as 'character qualifications and
standing' are very general, but this court recognizes that in the
area of personal fitness for medical staff privileges precise standards are difficult if not impossible to articulate. . . . The subjectives of selection simply cannot be minutely codified. The
governing board of a hospital must therefore be given great latitude in prescribing the necessary qualifications for potential applicants. . . . So long as the hearing process gives notice of the
particular charges of incompetence and the ethical fallibilities,
24 9 we
need not exact a prdcis of the standard in codified form."
The selection of physicians for hospital staff privileges is necessarily
subjective. Thus, the hospital's interest in not having to define rigid

precise selection criteria that might exclude qualified physicians, outweighs the physician's interest in a specific, well defined selection process. Professional, ethical and character qualifications are related to the
246. Schlein v. Milford Hosp., 423 F. Supp. at 544.
247. JCAH, ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 202, at 108: "'Themedical staff must
establish a procedure to ensure a fair evaluation of the qualifications and the competence of
each applicant for appointment, and for periodic reappqintment, to the medical staff.
Whatever the procedure, it should be objective, impartial, and fair, broad enough to recognize professional excellence and strict enough to safeguard patients. The selection of persons to be recommended for appointment shall depend upon a thorough study of the
qualifications of each applicant." JCAH, GUIDELINES, supra note 202, 6-7: "Only physicians. . . licensed to practice. . . who can document their background, experience, training
and demonstrated competence, their adherence to the ethics of their profession, their good
reputation, and their ability to work with others, with sufficient adequacy to assure the medical staff and the governing body that any patient treated by them in the hospital will be
given a high quality of medical care, shall be qualified for membership on the medical staff."
(Art. III, § 2(a)). BYLAWS AND RULES OF THE MEDICAL AND DENTAL STAFF, SEQUOIA
HOSPITAL DISTRICT 2 (1970): "The Credentials Committee shall investigate the character,
competence, ability, background, experience, training and prior hospital staff experience of
all applicants, and shall submit a written report recommending approval, deferral, or rejection of the application after the committee has received sufficient information to competently judge the qualifications of the applicant." Cf. CMA, MODEL MEDICAL STAFF
BYLAWS, supra note, at 3: "Only licensed physicians and surgeons whose total background,
experience and training assures . . . that any patient admitted to or treated in . . . [the]
Hospital, will be given the best possible care and professional skill, shall be and remain
qualified for membership to the medical staff."
248. Sosa v. Board of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir.
1971).
249. Id at 176 (citations omitted).
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operation of the hospital25 ° and the physician's interest in staff privileges is safeguarded in that he will have the opportunity to respond to
the specific objections of the selection body at a hearing.
An example of a bylaw which deals with information not reasonably related to the operation of the hospital or delivery of medical care
is a Stanford University Hospital bylaw which requires the applicant
for staff privileges, if requested, to furnish information as to whether
any general liability insurance coverage has ever been restricted in any
way or involuntarily cancelled."5 ' Although medical malpractice insurance coverage 252 is related to the purpose of providing medical care,
the past history of the applicant's car, home, fire and other insurance
has no such relation and is clearly an inappropriate consideration in
determining hospital staff privileges.
In conclusion, the CMA and JCAH guidelines for formulation of
hospital staff bylaws are generally adequate in supplying procedural
due process to physicians in staff privileges proceedings. Right to counsel is the one major area where the physician can be said not to be
sufficiently protected. The Anton case upheld the discretionary policy
expressed in the guidelines that the right to an attorney is within the
discretion of the review committee as meeting minimal due process.
This discretionary power should be found to be easily abused. Where
an attorney is present for any purpose at the hearing, such as to be the
hearing officer or to assist the review committee, the accused physician's right to an attorney should be mandatory. Given the important
interest of the physician, especially in reappointment or removal cases,
and
the minimal interest of the hospital of maintaining peer review and
minimizing
legal formalism, an attorney should be allowed at the hearing to represent the interests of the physician in most cases. In another
problem area, bylaws must be scrupulously overseen to provide against
qualification factors being imposed for staff membership that are not
related to the purposes of providing adequate medical care and operating the hospital. The CMA and JCAH guidelines have been quite responsive to judicial changes and demands, and their adoption by
hospitals will no doubt provide the physician with greater procedural
protections of his interest in staff privileges.
Conclusion
The prerequisite findings of state action and an affected liberty or
property interest needed to invoke constitutional due process are increasingly stumbling blocks to the physician seeking to invoke Four250. Id See Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968).
251. STANFORD BYLAWS, supra note 237, at 4, art. 4.1 (A)(6).

252. Information as to medical malpractice insurance status is also required under the
bylaw. Id

262
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teenth Amendment due process to protect his staff privileges.
California offers an alternative solution by finding a common law right
to fair procedure that is required in the contexts of appointment, reappointment and revocation of staff privileges.
A realistic appraisal of the situation may be the Anton court's observation that accrediting organizations, by requiring due process in
their accrediting standards, will have the effect of standardizing due
process protections in hospitals throughout the country. Since accrediting organization guidelines and model bylaws are largely constitutionally sufficient and often go beyond the minimal most litigation
involving staff constitutional requirements, privileges would be limited
to the issue of whether the hospital has followed its own bylaws. Nevertheless, given the immense interest of the physician in having staff
privileges and the relatively minimal burden on the hospital in providing the elements of due process in procedures dealing with those privileges, the physician should be afforded procedural protection of his
staff privileges in all situations.

